Introduction
One of the fundamental principles of Torah Law is the preeminence given to a Jew’s life. So basic is this value that, at the very beginning of his Mishneh Torah, when outlining Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, “The Laws [that are] the Fundamentals of the Torah,” Rambam writes:
When a non-Jew comes and forces a Jew to violate one of the Torah’s commandments on the pain of death, [the Jew] should violate [the commandment] rather than be killed, because it is written concerning the mitzvos, “so that by fulfilling them man will live,” [i.e., the mitzvos were given “so that] by fulfilling them man will live” and not die because of them.
This is a general guideline that applies to all the commandments with the exception of the worship of false deities, incestuous or adulterous intimate relations, and bloodshed. Once stated, it is not necessary for the Rambam to restate it elsewhere in the Mishneh Torah. Nevertheless, we find that he does restate it in Hilchos Shabbos.
In doing so, Rambam is following the pattern established by our Sages in the Talmud. In several sources, they state the general principle that “There are no [commandments] that take precedence over pikuach nefesh (saving a Jew’s life) except [those forbidding] the worship of false deities, incestuous or adulterous intimate relations, and bloodshed.” Nevertheless, when it comes to the question of whether a danger to a Jew’s life overrides the observance of the Shabbos laws, they do not rely on this general principle, but ask, “Which source teaches that pikuach nefesh is given precedence over [the observance of ] Shabbos?”
In a carefully nuanced sichah, the Rebbe compares the different teachings in the Talmud and the Mishneh Torah, highlighting the specific references in the sources and explains the differences between them, distinguishing between Shabbos and the other commandments: When one violates a commandment for the sake of preserving a Jew’s life, the violation is not only sanctioned, it is an absolute requirement. However, the commandment is considered to have been violated. With regard to Shabbos, by contrast, not only is violating the Shabbos prohibitions to preserve a Jew’s life not considered a transgression, these actions are deemed as observing Shabbos.
The Rebbe explains the above basing himself on the verse, “Keep My Shabbosos, for [Shabbos] is a sign between Me and you for your generations, so that [you] know that I, G-d, make you holy.” Rashi comments on that verse, “[Shabbos] is a great sign of distinction between us that I have chosen you, by granting you as an inheritance My day of rest for [your] rest.” Since the purpose of the mitzvah of resting on Shabbos is to serve as, “a great sign of distinction between us that I have chosen you,” violating Shabbos to save a Jew’s life is an expression of the observance of Shabbos, inasmuch as it highlights that sign of distinction – that G-d has chosen the Jewish people.
In a broader sense, this principle applies to all the mitzvos, because all the mitzvos are a “sign of distinction” between the Jews and G-d, underscoring that G-d chose them. Nevertheless, although this concept applies to all mitzvos, it is specifically and explicitly stated – and established as the core message of the mitzvah itself – only regarding Shabbos. For that reason, the Talmud and Rambam single out Shabbos and restate the basic principle of the preeminence of Jewish life only regarding it.
The Preeminence of Life
1. In the midst of the discussion of the prominence of pikuach nefesh, saving a Jew’s life, our Sages ask, “Which source teaches that pikuach nefesh is given precedence over [the observance of ] Shabbos?” The Talmud mentions several different possible sources from which to derive this principle and concludes that the derivation that cannot be disputed comes from the verse in Parshas Acharei, “You shall observe My statutes and My judgments so that by fulfilling them man will live.” Our Sages explain that this verse is teaching that the observance of the Torah must enable a person to “ ‘live’ by [fulfilling] ‘them,’ and not die because of them.”
On the surface, clarification is required: There is a general principle that applies throughout the entire Torah, “There are no [commandments] that take precedence over pikuach nefesh except [those forbidding] the worship of false deities, incestuous or adulterous intimate relations, and bloodshed.” Once this general principle has been established regarding all the mitzvos, there is no need to seek another source that applies regarding any other mitzvah. Why then is it necessary to derive the concept that pikuach nefesh overrides [the observance of ] Shabbos from the phrase, “ ‘live’ by [fulfilling] ‘them.’ ”
Moreover, many sources understand the concept – that when being challenged to violate a Scriptural commandment on the pain of death, a person should transgress and not be killed – as being derived from the same verse, “ ‘live’ by [fulfilling] ‘them,’ and not die because of them.” Accordingly, it appears that by stating this teaching specifically regarding Shabbos, our Sages are not reiterating the concept previously stated regarding other mitzvos, but rather, teaching a different concept, specifically related to Shabbos.
However, that conclusion raises questions:
- What specific concept is derived from “[by fulfilling] them [man] will live” that applies regarding Shabbos?
- Fundamentally, how could it be said that the verse, “You shall observe My statutes and... [by fulfilling] them [man] will live,” teaches a lesson specifically regarding Shabbos? The verse refers to mitzvos as a whole and not to Shabbos specifically.
Clarification is also necessary regarding Rambam’s treatment of the subject. He also states this concept twice. First, in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah, he states:
What is implied? When a non-Jew comes and forces a Jew to violate one of the Torah’s commandments on the pain of death, [the Jew] should violate [the commandment] rather than be killed, because it is written concerning the mitzvos, “so that by fulfilling them man will live,” [i.e., the mitzvos were given “so that] by fulfilling them man will live,” and not die because of them. If a person dies rather than transgress, he is held accountable for his life.
Afterwards, in Hilchos Shabbos, Rambam states,
It is forbidden to hesitate before transgressing the Shabbos [laws] on behalf of a person who is dangerously ill, as [reflected in the interpretation of the phrase,] “so that by fulfilling them man will live” and not die because of them.
The same question raised above with regard to the Talmud applies with regard to Rambam: Why did the Rambam find it necessary to cite the derivation of the same concept twice?
When Shabbos Is like an Ordinary Weekday
2. Ostensibly, it is possible to offer the following explanation: In Hilchos Shabbos, Rambam adds, “This teaches that the judgments of the Torah do not [bring] vengeance to the world, but rather [bring] mercy, kindness, and peace to the world.” However, he does not make such statements in Hilchos Yesodei HaTorah regarding all the other mitzvos.
From this, it can be understood that this concept is relevant only regarding the principle that pikuach nefesh overrides the Shabbos prohibitions, as Rambam continues in the above text regarding Shabbos, “[Concerning] those non-believers who say that [administering such treatment to one who is dangerously ill] constitutes a violation of the Shabbos and is forbidden, [one may] apply the verse, ‘I gave them statutes [which they misinterpret and cause to be] not beneficial and judgments by which [– according to their mistaken interpretation –] they cannot live.’ ”
It is possible to clarify this concept as follows: The principle that pikuach nefesh takes precedence over all the mitzvos and that a person should violate these prohibitions and not be killed is a specific law to be understood as an independent matter, i.e., the intent is not that the obligation to observe the mitzvos does not apply when there is a danger to life. Instead, the obligation remains; it is only that pikuach nefesh overrides it.
Different principles apply regarding Shabbos, as Rambam states, “The general principle is that Shabbos is considered as an ordinary weekday regarding everything needed by a person who is dangerously ill.” The intent is not that pikuach nefesh overrides the prohibition against performing forbidden labor on Shabbos, but rather it causes Shabbos to be considered as an ordinary weekday. Regarding those matters needed by a person who is dangerously ill, it is as if Shabbos does not exist.
This approach is reflected in the statement of Maggid Mishneh that, according to Rambam, the law concerning the performance of a forbidden labor for the sake of a sick person – “Whenever it is possible to deviate [from the ordinary practice], one should do so” – applies only regarding a woman giving birth but not regarding one whose life is in danger. In the latter instance, “Shabbos... is considered as an ordinary weekday regarding everything....” and “one may desecrate [the Shabbos laws to provide] for all [his] needs, even though withholding a particular matter from him would not be life-threatening.”
