Unlike the prohibitions of Chalav Yisrael, the prohibition of Gevinat Akum, cheese produced by a non-Jew, is observed by all observant Jews in (mostly) the same manner. We shall outline the development and the parameters of this prohibition as well as some of the issues that are debated by twentieth century Poskim. The essay will be based on three essays on this topic that have been recently written by three Kashrut professionals - Rav Yaakov Borow in Tenuva’s Binetiv Hechalav pp. 43-47, Rav Zushe Blech in the Orthodox Union’s Daf Kashrut of Adar I 5757, and Rav Avraham Juravel’s discussion that is published in a Kashrut journal known as Mehadrin, Adar II 5755.
Talmudic Background
The Rambam (Hilchot Maachalot Asurot 3:12-13) notes that fundamentally, there is more reason to be lenient regarding cheese produced by a non-Jew than milk produced by a non-Jew. This is because, the Rambam writes, milk from a non-kosher animal cannot be made into cheese. Nevertheless, Chazal prohibited consuming cheese produced by a non-Jew. The Gemara offers many possible reasons for this enactment, but the Mishnah (Avodah Zarah 29b and see Avodah Zarah 35a) indicates that Chazal at first concealed the reason for this enactment.
The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35) searches for the reason behind this enactment and cites a plethora of explanations. One explanation is that non-Jews curdle the milk with the stomach lining from animals that were not properly slaughtered (Niveilot). Another reason is that the non-Jews did not take adequate care to cover the milk that would be used to make cheese and Chazal were concerned that snakes would release their venom into the uncovered liquids. Another is that the non-Jews smoothed over the cheese with pig fat. Yet another explanation is that Chazal were concerned that there were leftover drops of milk in the cheese that did not curdle and these drops of milk might have been from a non-Kosher animal. Another explanation is that they made the cheese from non-Kosher vinegar.
Rishonim
The Rishonim debate which of these reasons is the accepted approach. The Rambam (Hilchot Maachalot Asurot 3:13) codifies the reason that they use the stomach lining of Niveilot to curdle the cheese. Rabbeinu Tam (cited in Tosafot Avodah Zarah 35a s.v. Chada), on the other hand, believes that the primary concern is that the milk was exposed to snake venom. The Shulchan Aruch (Y.D. 115:2) adopts the approach of the Rambam.
The Rishonim also debate whether the enactment forbidding Gevinat Akum applies even when the concerns for the enactment are not relevant. Rabbeinu Tam (ibid) asserts that the concerns are not relevant today since snakes are not prevalent in our environs. He argues that Chazal did not issue this enactment in a situation where concern for snake venom is not relevant. Furthermore, he states:
“In many places Jews eat cheese produced by non-Jews since the non-Jews use flowers to curdle the milk and the Geonim of Narbonne (Southern France) permitted this practice. However, in our places (Northern France and Germany) there is reason to be strict since they use stomach linings to curdle milk.”
The Rambam (Hilchot Ma’achalot Asurot 3:14), however, records that “some Geonim” rule that the prohibition of Gevinat Akum applies even when the reason for the enactment does not apply. He writes:
“Cheese that non-Jews curdle with grass or with fruit juice such as date tree sap and it is evident in the cheese [that an animal product was not used to produce the cheese], some Geonim ruled that it is nevertheless forbidden because the enactment applies to all cheese produced by non-Jews whether or not a Kosher or non-Kosher curdling agent was used.”
It should be noted that the Rambam does not cite any authority that disputes the ruling of the Geonim and the Rambam does not criticize this ruling. Rav Yosef Karo (both in his Kesef Mishneh commentary to the Rambam and in his Beit Yosef commentary to the Tur) asserts, therefore, that the Rambam concurs with the ruling of the Geonim. The Maggid Mishneh explains that the reason for this ruling is that it is a Davar Sh’b’minyan, that whenever Chazal forbade something, the prohibition remains even when the reason for the prohibition is not relevant (see
