נָשׂא אֶת רֹאשׁ בְּנֵי קְהָת מִתּוֹךְ בְּנֵי לֵוִי לְמִשְׁפְּחֹתָם לְבֵית אֲבֹתָם: ד, ב
Take a census of the sons of Kehas from among the sons of Levi, according to their families, according to their fathers’ house. (4:2)
Behold, a person must know that, for the most part, the yetzer does not incite a person to sin outright. It knows well that even if a person greatly desires a transgression, he will not sin, chalilah, brazenly and with contempt, for every Jew believes that HaKadosh Baruch Hu watches and observes his deeds, and he fears to rebel against Him. Therefore, the yetzer’s strategy is to cloak the sin in shades of permissibility, and even in appearances of mitzvah. In such a case, it becomes very difficult for a person to distinguish between good and evil, for he greatly desires that which is forbidden, and according to his yetzer, by refraining from it he is actually forgoing a mitzvah... It is only through this tactic that the yetzer succeeds in trapping a person in its snare.
And what is the advice against this? Adhere to all the customs of one’s forefathers and in their ways of conduct—even if these customs are not obligatory according to the letter of the law, and even if he finds it difficult to understand their purpose and meaning.
For anyone who holds fast to this principle—that he does not veer from the ways of his ancestors—will have the strength to stand against the temptations of the yetzer and say to it: even if you are right, I have received a tradition not to do things I did not see practiced by my forefathers. And since I did not see my forefathers engage in this “mitzvah,” I too see fit to refuse it.
However, at times, the yetzer finds a solution even for this. It entices a person from the outset not to adopt this principle for himself, and not to be so meticulous in following the ways of his ancestors—especially when it comes only to customs that are not obligatory. If a person allows himself to be persuaded in this, he will no longer have an answer when the yetzer later presents him with “justifications” for sins.
With this tactic, the yetzer appears especially to people of spirit—wise individuals who are attached to the Torah and delve deeply into understanding all the details of the laws and their reasons. And this is for two reasons. The first reason is that it knows it can find an opening with them. They differ from the simple folk, whose minds are not so expansive and who rely with closed eyes on the ways of their forefathers. Not so the chachmei HaTorah, who are capable of understanding the reason behind every single law, and who in practice also immerse themselves in understanding every matter. Therefore, it is easier to tempt them into thinking there is no reason to uphold all practices that are not obligatory, so long as their reasons are unclear. Why should a person do something when he does not know why he is doing it? And the mere fact that his ancestors practiced it is, in his view, not a sufficient reason to uphold it. He argues that perhaps they practiced it only due to some specific circumstance that compelled them at the time.
The second reason the yetzer desires that these individuals belittle the customs of their ancestors is that the gain from their downfall is many times greater. For once talmudei chachamim belittle the customs of their forefathers, they serve as an example for others to follow in their ways, and they too will no longer see any value in observing ancestral customs. And not only will they come to belittle customs, but even obligatory mitzvos, for as stated, guarding the customs serves as a safeguard for observing all the mitzvos. In the absence of this safeguard, the yetzer will invent justifications for every sin and wrongdoing.
Now, even the wise man will initially respond to his yetzer that it is not worthwhile to belittle customs, for he wishes to act with simplicity in following the customs of his ancestors, so that these will serve as a safeguard for the rest of the Torah’s laws. [As mentioned, through this, they will not succeed in distorting his judgment even regarding the fundamentals of Torah.] However, the yetzer will respond that he has no need for such a safeguard, for he is a great thinker and deeply knowledgeable in all the fine details of the Torah, and no one will succeed in swaying or distorting his understanding.
But the truth of the matter is there is no truth in the yetzer’s claim, for at the moment of trial, it will certainly produce many solutions and justifications—even for those precise halachic details the Talmid chacham knows thoroughly...
What emerges from all of this is that talmidei chachamim require even greater assistance from Heaven not to be swayed by the yetzer from the path of their forefathers, through the temptation that they have no need for it.
This matter is hinted at by the Torah in the posukim that speak of Sheivet Levi. For when counting each tribe, the Torah found it necessary to emphasize that their count was “by their families, according to their fathers’ houses.”
And this hints to the fact that the entire tribe was included in the count because they all served their Creator in the same way they had received from their ancestors. For every tribe had its own unique path in avodas Hashem, as taught by the Ari HaKadosh, and since all members of the tribe agreed to uphold the traditional path received by them, they were therefore worthy of being counted as a distinct group, to declare: this number of souls are united in serving Hashem according to their path.
For this reason, the Torah needed to say “by their families according to their fathers’ houses” only once per tribe, as we indeed see with all the other tribes. However, when it comes to the census of the tribe of Levi—the most sanctified tribe in Israel—we find that the Torah repeats these words for each individual family within the tribe. In the verse before us, regarding the sons of Kehas, the posuk says: “Take a census of the sons of Kehas... by their families, according to their fathers’ houses.” And at the beginning of Parashas Naso (4:22), when speaking of the census of the Gershonite family, it again says, “according to their fathers’ houses, by their families.” Later in the same chapter (4:29), when it speaks of the sons of Merari, it once again states, “by their families, according to their fathers’ houses,” etc.
This is nothing other than the Torah wishing to speak in praise of the tribe of Levi. For although they were bnei Torah (people of Torah), and the yetzer that entices toward belittling the traditions of one’s forefathers is most present among them, nonetheless they overcame this and forced themselves to uphold the ways of their ancestors. The Torah also intended that every talmid chacham, who is like the “tribe of Levi,” should learn from them how to nullify his own opinion in favor of the opinion of his forebears and believe that his understanding is not broad enough to fully grasp the reason behind every custom. He must rely on the wisdom of his earlier ancestors, who perceived and understood that this was the will of the Creator, Baruch Hu.
And since this parasha is usually read on the Shabbos before the chag of Shavuos, let us say something connected both to the chag and to the matter of preserving our customs.
It is fitting to pay attention to a wondrous fact: all the chagim obligate us in specific mitzvos. On Pesach, we are commanded regarding the eating of matzah and the prohibition of chametz, as well as all the mitzvos of the Seder night. On Sukkos, we are commanded in the mitzvos of the sukkah and the four species [arbah minim]. On Rosh Hashanah, the mitzvah is the sounding of the shofar. On Yom Kippur, we are commanded with five forms of affliction. Even on Chanukah and Purim, which are only of rabbinic origin, Chazal instituted commandments: lighting the Chanukah candles, and the four mitzvos of Purim.
But Shavuos and Shemini Atzeres are different. Besides the general commandment of refraining from labor, which applies to all chagim, there is no specific commandment unique to those days.
On the other hand, these two holidays are distinguished by the many customs associated with them. On Shavuos, we stay awake the entire night and recite Tikkun Leil Shavuos. We read Sefer Rus [the Book of Ruth], eat dairy foods, and spread greenery in shuls and homes. Likewise, Shemini Atzeres is filled with many customs: we do the hakafos (dancing with the Torah), we rejoice with the Torah, we honor each member of the congregation with an aliyah to the Torah, even the children are called up. There is the special aliyah of “Kol HaNe’arim” (All the Children), and the reading of Bereishis under a chuppah of tallisos. Each of these customs has its reasons, but they are customs only—not halachic obligations. And although some are mentioned in the poskim, they are only mentioned in the framework of custom, for they are ancient traditions from previous generations.
Therefore, they are brought in their writings, but they are not even on the level of binding law from the Talmud.
And this is puzzling. Why should these holidays, in which we celebrate the giving and completion of the Torah, be precisely the ones that do not include any Torah-mandated obligation?
It occurred to me to suggest a beautiful reason for this: it is to teach us that the customs of Israel [minhagei Yisrael] are actual Torah. Therefore, specifically on these holidays in which we rejoice with the holy Torah, we were given only customs—so that we may understand that these too are like fundamental elements of Torah.
by the tzaddik and mekubal Hagaon Harav Gamliel Hakohen Rabinovitch, shlita
