On Simchas Torah, while saying Yizkor, Mr. Feldman had quietly pledged $360 to charity in memory of his parents. However, the weeks after Sukkos were very pressured at work, so that he didn’t honor his pledge promptly.
“You mentioned that you pledged $360 at Yizkor,” Mrs. Feldman said to her husband a month later. “Whatever happened with that donation? I don’t see it in the bank statement.”
“I’ve been very busy,” Mr. Feldman acknowledged. “Thank you for reminding me.”
Mr. Feldman sat down to make out a check for his yizkor pledge. However, he did not remember to which charity he had pledged!
“I don’t remember whether I pledged to the local Kollel or the local Tomchei Shabbos,” Mr. Feldman said to his wife. “By any chance do you remember?”
“No, I don’t remember,” replied Mrs. Feldman. “I don’t think that you told me to which cause you pledged. I guess you’ll have to give to both.”
“Right now we’re a bit tight,” Mr. Feldman said. “The yomim tovim entailed a lot of expenses, and we distributed a lot of tzedakah during the yomim noraim.”
“Then maybe it’s enough to choose either cause,” said Mrs. Feldman. “After all, you only pledged $360.”
“Or maybe, since I don’t remember, I don’t have to give to either?” suggested Mr. Feldman. “Neither organization can claim the money, and I’m in possession!”
“That sounds strange to me,” replied Mrs. Feldman. “But check it out!”
Mr. Feldman called Rabbi Dayan and asked:
“Am I obligated to give to one of the causes? Must I give to both?”
Chasam Sofer (Y.D. #240)
addresses this question in his responsa,” replied Rabbi Dayan. “He notes that Shulchan Aruch rules in a similar case, regarding a person who is unsure how much he pledged, that he must give the higher amount. Similarly, if a person is unsure whether certain money that he holds belongs to tzedakah, he is required to give it to tzedakah” (Y.D. 258:3; 259:5).
Chasam Sofer explains that the fundamental question here is whether we view questionable tzedakah as other monetary issues, where the rule is to favor the one in possession, so that the person should be exempt, or as a religious issue, where the rule is safek d’oraysa l’chumra, to be stringent, so that the person is liable.
The Mishnah (Pe’ah 4:11) teaches that questionable leket (fallen grain) belongs to the poor. The Yerushalmi bases this on several verses, some particular to leket, and some – among them “ani varash hatzdiku – justify the poor in his dispute” – that can be extended to tzedakah in general.
Ramban and most Rishonim rule that safek d’oraysa l’chumra in all areas of tzedakah, whereas Ran (Nedarim 7a) and Nimukei Yosef (B.B. 148b) maintain that questionable tzedakah, other than leket, is subject to the general monetary rule preferring the one in possession.
Chasam Sofer rules like most Rishonim that safek tzedakah l’chumra. He therefore concludes that in our case the person should give to both causes. Nonetheless, he concludes that although we instruct the person to do so, Beis Din cannot enforce payment to both causes.
However, some authorities allow changing the purpose of tzedakah, so that even if a person pledged to A, he can give to B. Chasam Sofer writes elsewhere (Y.D. #244) that tzedakah can be changed to a higher purpose. Poskim also allow doing hataras nedarim to enable giving to another cause, certainly a higher one (Tzedakah U’mishpat 9:11[42-43]; see Aruch Hashulchan Y.D. 258:10).
“Thus, it is preferable to give to both causes out of doubt,” concluded Rabbi Dayan. “However, if this is difficult, you can give to the local kollel, because support of Torah scholars is considered a higher level of tzedakah, especially if you make hataras nedarim in case you pledged otherwise.”
Verdict: Most Rishonim rule that we are stringent with questionable tzedakah, like other safek d’oraysa l’chumra, despite the monetary aspect. However, because some authorities allow changing the purpose of tzedakah, giving to the higher cause can suffice.
Based on writings of Harav Chaim Kohn, shlita
