Answers to this Week’s Riddles
(For the riddles, please see back page)
1)
The Sifri rules that even if a judge is afraid that one of the parties in a court case may kill his son if he rules against him, he is still prohibited from recusing himself, as the Torah commands judges to rule fairly and not to fear the litigants. The Bach (Choshen Mishpot 12:1) maintains that the question of whether this prohibition applies in a case where a judge fears for his life is subject to a dispute between Rashi and Tosfos, with Rashi arguing that the judge is not required to endanger his own life and Tosfos disagreeing.
The Shu”t Shevus Yaakov (143) challenges the Bach, as the Sifri seems to state clearly that the judge may not recuse himself even to save his own life. To resolve this difficulty, the Shevus Yaakov suggests that the reasoning of the Sifri is not because a judge is required to endanger his life, but because Jews are in general not suspected of being murderers. However, if the judge has concrete grounds on which to be concerned that one of the litigants may indeed try to kill him, he is permitted to recuse himself, as saving one’s life takes precedence over all mitzvos except for avodah zorah, giluy aroyas and shefichas domim [idolatry, forbidden relations and murder].
The Shu”t Zekan Aharon (126) argues that it is farfetched to explain the Sifri in this manner, and he maintains that the judge must be willing to risk his life even if he has grounds to believe that he is in danger. He explains that even though other mitzvos are pushed aside to save one’s life, this mitzvah is different, as the Torah explicitly commands the judge to do his job and not to be afraid of the potential consequences. (R’ Ozer Alport)
2)
The Teshuvos HaRashbah (1:18) answers that the mitzvah is not completely in the hands of the Sanhedrin. It could well be that the litigants won’t accept the ruling of the Sanhedrin, or they may be mochel [forgive] each other, therefore, they can’t make a berachah as it may end up being a berachah levatolah [blessing in vain].
The Chasam Sofer (Orach Chaim 54) asks: What difference does it make if the litigants don’t accept the ruling, beis din have the power to enforce their ruling, and they will be able to force there pesak in all cases.
The Chasam Sofer explains the Rashbah, that true the litigants always have to listen, however, if they only listen when beis din force them, it’s a kilkul [bad situation] and on such a situation we don’t make a berachah. Although, in the end they will be listening to beis din, at the beginning they weren’t and the rule is כל דבר שאין עשייתו גמר מצוה אין מברכין – “anything that the initial act of the mitzvah is not the complete mitzvah, no berachah is recited”. So, although ultimately they will listen, at the beginning they didn’t, therefore, no berachah is recited.
The Tosfos Berachah also questions the explanation of the Rashbah, arguing that the mitzvah to judge a dispute is independent of the acceptance of the verdict and warrants a berachah for fulling the commandment to hear the case and issue a decision even if it is subsequently ignored, just as we make a berachah before performing the mitzvah of shechitah without worrying that perhaps a physical defect will be found in the animal that renders it non-kosher.
Instead, the Tosfos Berachah notes that the wording of the berachah recited before doing a mitzvah is אשר קדשנו במצותיו וצונו – “Who has sanctified us with His mitzvos and commanded us to do this mitzvah”. The Gemara (Kiddushin 2b) teaches that the term “kiddushin” signifies separation, as a man betroths a woman by stating that she is now מקודשת to him and forbidden to all other men in the world. In this sense, the berachah recited before doing a mitzvah is our way of praising Hashem for separating us from the nations of the world by giving us the commandment we are about to fulfill. Accordingly, it is only appropriate to say a berachah when we are doing a mitzvah that is unique to Jews and makes us distinct. Because the establishment of a system of courts to mete out justice is one of the shevah mitzvos bnei Noach [seven Noahide laws] (Sanhedrin 56a), we cannot say אשר קדשנו במצוותיו - “Who has separated us through His commandments” – when performing this mitzvah.
The Birchas Aharon (Berachos, Maamer 268) answers that berachos are only recited when an individual can fulfil the mitzvah by himself, such as lulav and tzitzis, if other people are needed to help carry out the mitzvah then no berachah is recited. So, it’s true that appointing dayonim is a mitzvah, however, at least three people are needed to form a beis din, therefore, each dayan on his own is unable to make a berachah.
3)
Rashi (1:17) on the pasuk: כקטן כגדל תשמעון - “small like big you shall listen to”, writes: If a judge has a case involving a small amount of money in front of him and another case comes up involving a larger amount of money, he may not give precedence to the latter case, but must rule on the cases in the order in which they were presented. It seems that without this drosha, we wouldn’t know that the one who comes first should be treated first.
R’ Aharon Leib (Ayalas HaShachar), wonders if the above applies to people waiting in a queue. He then brings that the Chazon Ish was asked what prohibition is transgressed by somebody who cuts in line, and he responded that such a person is violating the accepted way of the world, which utilizes universally agreed-upon rules such as the concept of a line to establish order.
4)
R’ Shlomah Zalman Auerbach (Halichos Shlomah, Tisha B’Av, Perek 15, he’orah 45) addresses this question. He writes: The reason we don’t tear garments on days when tachanun is omitted, is because such days are happy days, which helps take away some of the sadness of aveilus over the fact that the Beis HaMikdosh was destroyed. However, יום זה שהוקבע להיות כולנו אבילים ומקוננים בו על החורבן, נהי דאקרי מועד, היתכן שיגרע הוא עצמו מצער בחורבן – “This day which was established as a day of mourning and crying over the churban, it’s true that it may be called a Mo’ed, however, it doesn’t make sense to say that this should take away from the pain caused due to the churban.”
5)
The Shu”t Teshuvah M’Ahavah (Introduction to vol. 1) answers based on the Gemara in Pesochim (49b). The Gemara says: The hatred of amay ha’eretz towards talmiday chachomim is worse than the hatred of the nations of the world towards the Yidden. The Teshuvah M’Ahavah explains, that sometimes amay ha’eretz make mistakes, and they think someone is a talmid chocham when really he isn’t and they start hating him for no good reason. The reason they make such a mistake is because they themselves are unlearned, so they find it hard to differentiate between one who is a talmid chocham and one who isn’t. So, it comes out, that because they don’t learn (עזבתם את תורתי), they end up hating people for no good reason.
Along the same lines, the Chasam Sofer (Droshos Vol. 2, pg. 550) quotes something he heard from the Hafla’ah. The Gemara in Shabbos (138b) teaches: “In the future, Torah will be forgotten from Klal Yisroel”. The Hafla’ah explains: When Moshiach comes we will need to fix up the sin of sinas chinom, however, it will be very difficult as amay ha’eretz hate talmiday chachomim. The only way we will be able to do complete teshuvah, and get rid of the sin of sinas chinom, is if talmiday chachomim forget all their learning – then and only then will the amay ha’eretz stop hating them.
6)
R’ Moshe Sternbuch (Teshuvos V’Hanagos 2:251) is in doubt as to whether one is allowed to hold a child in his lap on Tisha B’Av. The Gemara in Mo’ed Kotan (26b) says: אבל לא יניח תינוק בתוך חיקו מפני שמביאו לידי שחוק ויתגנה על הבריות – “A mourner should not place a child in his lap because it will bring him to laughter, and he will be disgraced in the eyes of other people” (because he laughed while mourning). Since the dinim of aveilus apply on Tisha B’Av there is no reason this one shouldn’t apply either. Moreover, the reason behind this prohibition is because it makes one get excited and in a good mood, therefore, certainly it should be prohibited on Tisha B’Av, and one should refrain from holding a child and playing with him on Tisha B’Av.
However, R’ Moshe continues: I never understood this Gemara. Why does the Gemara need to say, “and he will be disgraced in the eyes of other people”, surely, it’s a prohibition in its right - who cares what other people think? R’ Moshe quotes the Tosfos Berachah who asks this question and ends off, שצריך נגר ליישבם – “we need an expert blacksmith to explain these words”.
R' Moshe then says: ואנא לא נגר ולא בר נגר, אבל נראה לפרש הדברים כפשוטם - “I am not a blacksmith or the son of a blacksmith, however, we can explain the Gemara very simply.” Playing with a child sitting on one’s lap, and even playing with the child is not necessarily a contradiction to being in mourning. One is simply playing with his/her child. However, people look at the avel who is holding the child and look at it as a derogatory thing, therefore, Chazal forbade it.
R' Moshe concludes: Although today we don’t know how to mourn properly, and today people don’t look at it as a lack of mourning, Chazal already forbade it, therefore it remains forbidden, and one should refrain from doing it during aveilus and on Tisha B’Av. The poskim equate the two areas of halachah, therefore, if during shivah it’s forbidden, on Tisha B’Av as well, it should be forbidden.
A baby doesn’t need to be left on the floor to cry the entire Tisha B’Av, however, when holding the baby one should remember it’s Tisha B’Av and shouldn’t get to carried away with playing with baby.
7)
R’ Shlomah Zalman Auerbach (Halichos Shlomah, Tisha B’Av, Perek 16, s.k. 3) says: If one is unwell and he needs to take tablets on Tisha B’Av and he can’t swallow them without water, one may swallow them with water, and one doesn’t need to add anything bitter to the water (not like Yom Kippur when one does).
The question is however, if one needs water, should he recite the berachah of shehakol?
The Shevet HaLevi (10:83) says: Although certainly one benefits from the water, the only reason he is drinking it is for the tablets, therefore, the berachah of shehakol should not be recited.
8)
R’ Shlomah Zalman (Halichos Shlomah, Tisha B’Av 15:8) rules that wishing mazel tov on Tisha B’Av is allowed. Not only did R’ Shlomah Zalman say that it’s allowed, he himself would do this. He used to wish people mazel tov on Tisha B’Av and to aveilim in their week of shiva.
The L’Horas Nossan (2:37) brings an interesting proof. The Butchater (Ezer MiKodesh 21:66) says: “Even though one shouldn’t ask after the welfare of a women, one is allowed to wish her mazel tov after a bris, as it is a tefillah. Similarly, at a chasunah one may wish a women mazel tov.” We see that mazel tov isn’t called שאילת שלום, asking about one’s welfare, therefore, it would be allowed on Tisha B’Av and during aveilus.
The Shu”t Har Tzvi (Yoreh Deah 290) was asked: “In England there is a minhag to extend a hand to those who are mourning and wish them ‘long life’ (chaim aruchim) is it considered asking about one’s welfare?
The Har Tzvi says: Doing this is a berachah to the avel, and is not included in the issur of asking an avel about his welfare.
9)
There are a number of answers to the above question:
i) The Imrei Emes answers that this is peshat in the pasuk in Eicha (2:8) which says: חשב ה' להשחית חומת בת ציון נטה קו. Because it is forbidden to destroy a pre-existing shul before building a new one in its place, before hashem destroyed the walls of Tzion He was already נטה קו, he already started to construction of the third Beis HaMikdosh.
However, this only fits according to the Sefas Emes (Megillah 26) who learns that as long as one has started building a new shul, one may destroy the old one. However, the Ritva learns that simply starting is not enough and the new shul must be completely finished before knocking down the pre-existing one (See Mishnah Berurah 152:6 and Biur Halachah at length)
ii) The Gemara in Bava Basra (3b) says that the prohibition to destroy a shul before building a new one doesn’t apply to kings, as a king can do what he wants, and we aren’t concerned that they won’t be able to bring their plans to fruition. “If a king wants to uproot mountains, he can uproot mountains.” If by a normal king we say the above, certainly by the King of kings we can say this. (Likutei Yehudah, quoting R’ Meir Shapiro)
iii) From the sugya in Bava Basra, it’s clear that the reason behind the above issur, is because we are worried שמא יפשע, that one may be negligent and not get round to rebuilding a new shul. By Hakodosh Boruch Hu we can’t say such things - there is no negligence by Him, therefore, the issur doesn’t apply. (Likutei Yehudah, quoting R’ Meir Shapiro)
iiii) Rashi in Succah (41a) and in Rosh Hashanah (30b) says that the future Beis HaMikdosh which we hope for is already built and it will come down complete from Shomayim. Therefore, it is in fact already built, therefore, there was no problem for Hashem to destroy the previous one.
v) Chazal tell us that the fact that Hashem let his anger out on bricks and stones was a big chesed, as instead of letting it out on us, He let it out on bricks and stones. Destroying the Beis HaMikdosh was a matter of pickuach nefesh, and when it comes to pikuach nefesh, we push aside all other issurim.
vi) Finally, perhaps we can suggest, that it’s true that destroying the Beis HaMikdosh may have been an issur, however, it wasn’t Hashem that did it, it was us. Because of our sins, it was destroyed, and it was us that caused it.
