I. Conceptual Issues of Honest Weights and Measures
a. The Pesukim
i. In Vayikra 19,35-36, the Torah presents honest weights and measures in the context of לא תעשו עול במשפט (perversion of justice). The Torah concludes that HaShem took us out of Egypt.
ii. In Devarim 25,13-15, the Torah promises arichus yamim (lengthening of days) for having honest weights and measures and considers not having honest weights and measures a to'eva (abomination).
b. Chazal
i. The Sifra (Kedoshim 8,5) asks: why is not having honest weights and measures a form of עול במשפט? The Sifra states that one must conclude that one who measures is considered a dayan (judge) and therefore, distortion of the measures is considered עול במשפט. The Sifra then lists a number of terrible descriptions for someone who commits such a perversion.
ii. The Gemara (Bava Metzia 61b) notes that the specific prohibition of “weights” refers to someone who submerges the weights in salt (thus causing them to be miscalibrated). The Gemara asks: isn't that actual gezel (stealing)? The Gemara answers that one violates the prohibition from the moment one tampers with the weights (even if they are not used for a sale).
c. Rambam in Sefer haMitzvos lists three separate mitzvos regarding honest weights and measures:
i. A positive mitzvah to calibrate one's weights and measures properly. (Positive Mitzvah 208)
ii. A negative mitzvah that prohibits עול במשפט in the area of weights and measures. Here, Rambam quotes that Sifra that the measurer is like a dayan. (Negative Mitzvah 271)
iii. A negative mitzvah against having distorted measuring tools in one's home. (#272)
d. Rambam deals with these halachos in Hilchos Geneivah. In perek 7, he discusses the negative prohibitions. In perek 8 he discusses the positive commandment to calibrate one's measures.
i. Rambam writes that one prohibition is in weighing or measuring (as opposed to selling an item that is not properly weighted).
ii. Regarding the prohibition against having distorted measuring tools in one's home, Rambam writes that one may not even own one of these tools to use for something else (e.g. you can't use a miscalibrated measuring cup as a drinking cup).
e. Analysis
i. Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzvah 258) notes that there is a difference between gezel and honest weights and measures in that one only violates gezel by stealing the value of a perutah, whereas one violates honest weights and measures even if the distortion is less than a perutah.
ii. R. Yosef Babad (Minchas Chinuch, 1801-1874) asks: if there is in fact a difference between gezel and honest weights with regards to less than a shaveh perutah, why does the Gemara give a different answer to the question? Why does the Gemara answer that making distorted weights violates the prohibition?
iii. R. Isser Zalman Meltzer (1870-1953) answers that the prohibition against gezel cannot be compared to the prohibitions against dishonest weights and measures. The prohibitions against dishonest weights and measures are violated when one makes the utensils or when one measures the item. These take place before the sale. The only significance of less than a perutah when it comes to gezel is with regards to tashlumin. If one stole less than a perutah, there is no obligation to pay it back. However, it is certainly prohibited to steal less than a perutah. If one used dishonest weights and the difference is less than a perutah, tashlumin (or proper l’chatchila payment) is still relevant because the sale didn't take place yet. The seller (or buyer) can correct the mistake by charging the correct price and must do so, even if the difference is less than a perutah, because otherwise, it would be gezel. When the Gemara states לעבור עליו בשעת עשייה or the Sifra says that the measurer is like a dayan, the point is to highlight the fundamental difference between gezel and these prohibitions in the way they are violated. Less than a perutah is just a natural consequence of that difference. (Even haAizel Hilchos Geneiva 7,1)
II. Honesty in Keeping our Word
a. The Gemara (Bava Metziah 49a) has a discussion about whether one who verbally commits to a deal may back out of it without receiving a מי שפרע (a curse for one who backs out of a deal after paying money before taking possession of it). Rav holds that one is not bound by the verbal commitment and Rav Yochanan holds that one is. The Gemara supports the position of R. Yochanan from a statement of R. Yosi b. R. Yehuda that הין צדק means that שיהא הן שלך צדק ולאו שלך צדק. Abaye then (seemingly) rejects the application of R. Yosi b. R. Yehuda's statement by saying that maybe it means that one cannot say one thing while meaning something else. The Gemara later states that even R. Yochanan agrees that one can back out of a commitment to give a large gift. One is only committed to a small gift because the recipient believes that the deal will come through.
i. Rashi writes that Abaye is providing a different way to understand R. Yosi b. R. Yehuda. While initially, the Gemara used it as a proof that one cannot back out of a verbal commitment, even if one changed his mind about the deal after making the commitment, Abaye limits it to situations where one never planned on going ahead with the deal at the time of the commitment.
ii. Rif (1013-1103) codifies the opinion of R. Yochanan and also the interpretation of Abaye.
1. R. Zerachiah HaLevi (Ba'al HaMaor c. 1125-1186) asks: if Rif follows Rav Yochanan, how could he also follow Abaye? Doesn't the Gemara use Abaye's interpretation to reject R. Yochanan's proof?
2. Ramban (1194-1270) answers that if the basis of Rav Yochanan's ruling is that הין צדק demands that we are honest with our words, why does Rav Yochanan distinguish between a large present and a small present? Doesn't הין צדק require one to stick to a verbal commitment to a large present? Rather, it must be that once Rav Yochanan made the distinction between a large and small gift, he no longer relied on the derasha of הין צדק and Abaye's statement is applicable, independent of Rav Yochanan's opinion.
iii. R. Yaakov Betzalel Zolty (1920-1982) explains (full piece available here) that Ba'al HaMaor and Ramban disagree about the following issue: according to Ba'al HaMaor, the din of הין צדק means that when one makes a commitment, there is a partial kinyan that takes place and when one backs out of the commitment, he is cancelling that kinyan. As such, Rav Yochanan can distinguish between a large gift, where there is no semichus da'as and hence, no kinyan, and a small gift, where is a partial kinyan. Ramban, however, views הין צדק not as a kinyan, but as mitzvah to be faithful to one's words. If, as the Gemara initially suggested, הין צדק applies to be faithful to one's commitments even if circumstances later change, there is no reason to distinguish between large gifts and small gifts. One must keep one's commitment regardless. If we do make such a distinction, it must be because we follow Abaye's interpretation that הין צדק only requires one to be honest at the time one makes the commitment and not commit to a deal that one plans on backing out of.
1. R. Zolty notes the opinion of Rashi that the mitzvah incumbent upon a borrower to pay back a loan is based on הין צדק. The borrower has an obligation לאמת דבריו. R. Zolty notes that this mitzvah also applies to the yorshim of the lender. R. Zolty asks: why should the yorshim have an obligation to make the words of the borrower true. He explains that Rashi is of the opinion that commitments create a partial kinyan. Failure of the yorshim to follow up on that commitment is effectively an act of the yorshim that cancels the partial kinyan. Since they may not actively cancel the commitment, they have a mitzvah to pay back the loan.
2. R. Zolty notes that this issue carries over to the case of someone who promised a gift to someone and then died. If a commitment represents a partial kinyan, the yorshim would be obligated to fulfill the commitment. If, however, the obligation is based on an inherent mitzvah to fulfill one's obligations, then the yorshim have no such obligation.
iv. R. Yisrael Zev Gustman (1906-1991) writes that the concept of הין צדק as being an obligation to stick to one's commitments is not a random derasha unrelated to honest weights and measures. Rather, the idea is that just as the Sifra considers one to be a dayan in the area of weights and measures, we also consider one to be a dayan regarding the commitments that one makes. Even though it is just words, the Torah treats it with significance. (Kutrisim Shiurim Nedarim 1,13)
III. Hashkafic Ideas
a. R. Moshe Alshich (1508-1593) interprets the verse לא תעשו עול במשפט homiletically. We know that all of our parnasah is set from Rosh HaShanah. When someone cheats in weights and measures, he is taking a little more for himself and taking away from his friend. He is tampering with the mishpat of HaShem that was issued on Rosh HaShanah. (Toras Moshe VaYikra 19,35)
b. R. Shimshon R. Hirsch (1808-1888) writes that the mitzvos of honest weights and measures are the representative mitzvos for the way we live with others. The Torah doesn't only prohibit selling based on dishonest weights and measures, it prohibits making them and considers the measurer like a dayan because the Torah wants justice and righteousness to be part and parcel of our character as Jews. We are all responsible to uphold justice, just like the dayan. Furthermore, הין צדק teaches us that even our words serve that function when dealing with others.
c. R. Meir Chadash (1898-1989) presents a similar idea. He notes the Sifra that each person is considered a dayan and the consequences of עול. We see that every Jew has a tremendous responsibility and that being dishonest in this area doesn't only affect those directly involved, but all of klal Yisrael. Furthermore, Chazal, by extending this idea to הין צדק make us dayanim regarding every word that comes out of our mouths. (Ohr Meir Parshas Tazria)
d. R. Levi Yitzchak of Berditchev (1740-1809) notes an apparent contradiction between ma'amarei Chazal. One ma'amar says that after 120, we will be asked first if we were honest in business and then whether we set aside time for Torah. Another ma'amar says that the first order of business in the beis din shel ma'alah is Torah. R. Levi Yitzchak answers that there is no contradiction. When a person goes to the workplace and is particular about being honest in business, his mind is constantly focused on the pesukim, halachos and values regarding honest weights and measures. He is constantly learning while he is working. (Kedushas Levi Avos 2nd Perek)
e. R. Yaakov Moshe Lessin (1889-1975) notes that the mitzvos of honest weights and measures extend beyond the marketplace. We have a responsibility to ensure that all of our middos are balanced because even the slightest miscalibration can have negative consequences. (Orach haChaim 335)
i. A similar idea is presented by R. Baruch Shneersohn (1913-2001), with a specific focus on making sure that one values himself with proper measure (humble, but not too humble). (Birchas Shimon Parshas Ki Tzeisei)
f. The Lubavitcher Rebbe explains there is a novel law that even creating and maintaining such a dishonest device is prohibited. Using a faulty measurement system employs a deception in your business practices. Thus, even the manufacturing and/or procession of such devices leads one to a road of deception and dishonesty. Thus, must be aware and acknowledge its dangerous affects to live a proper life.
