Question
You wrote in an earlier article (Vayishlach, Nov 30, 2023) about a person who drove a borrowed car on Simchas Torah to a settlement in the vicinity of Gaza and killed Arabs and saved many lives but the car sustained damage. You brought many sources that maintain, and therefore you ruled, that the one who drove the borrowed car is not liable for the damages that were sustained by the car. You mentioned at the end that there is a possibility that the people whose lives or property was saved are obligated to reimburse the owner of the car for his loss. However, you did not elaborate and did not rule on this matter. Can you kindly elaborate and rule on this issue?
Answer
As we wrote in the previous article, even though this particular situation is Baruch Hashem very rare, the general issue, of which this case is a particular instance, is not rare. We mentioned that Rav Wosner ruled that if a Hatzolah volunteer damaged a parked car in his haste to save someone's life, the Hatzolah volunteer is not liable for the damages.
In that situation, your question would be whether the person whose life was saved must reimburse the owner of the parked car for his loss. We also mentioned that Rav Yitzchok Zilberstein paskened similarly about a person who drove an about-to-give-birth mother to the hospital and along the way he damaged cars. The equivalent of your question is whether the father of the newborn is liable for the damages to the parked cars.
Since there is no Gemara or SA that deals directly with your question we will try to deduce an answer from other sources.
There are three Acharonim who comment briefly about this issue.
The Chacham Tzvi (res. 132) comments that since we don't find that anyone ruled that the one who benefited must pay, it must be that he is not liable. Of course, this is a very weak proof. The Aruch Hashulchan (CM 380, 7) likewise rules that the one who was saved is not liable, and his reason is because he did not damage the one who suffered the loss. The Ohr Gadol (res 1) cites in passing the ruling of the Chacham Tzvi and comments that perhaps he should be liable because someone saved him from a loss. He does not comment further on the issue, since it is not the issue he was concerned with.
Before dealing with your question, it is important to examine a similar but slightly different question that was discussed by the Rishonim and ruled by the SA (YD 252, 11) concerning a person who spent money to free a captive from his captivity.
The Maharam of Rottenberg (Prague edition res. 39) ruled that the captive must reimburse those who spent money to secure his release even if the captive did not ask anyone to pay for his release. One of the reasons he gives is because those who spent money to secure his release are classified as a yoreid—one who voluntarily spent money to benefit another person. The rule is that the beneficiary of a yoreid must pay his benefactor for the benefit he received, up to the amount that the benefactor spent. We note that he writes that the benefit the captive received is that he was spared the suffering that befalls a captive.
While this case is different from your situation, we see from it that a person must reimburse one who suffered a loss in order to benefit him, even if the benefit was in preventing him from suffering mental and physical anguish and not the usual benefit that the beneficiary had a monetary gain.
A case in the Gemoro (Mishna BK 55B) where a person is obligated to pay for the benefit that he derived from being spared a loss is where A's sheep fell into B's field and the sheep were spared from injury because B's standing grain cushioned the impact of their fall. In this case the loss that was prevented was monetary. Since B's grain was damaged when it cushioned the fall, A is obligated to pay B for the benefit that he derived from B's grain in preventing damage to his sheep. The Gemoro (BK 58A) explains that the reason A must pay is because B suffered an involuntary loss due to the sheep's falling on his grass.
It is important to note that the Mishnah expressly states that A's liability is not for having damaged B, but for the benefit that he derived from B's loss. A was not negligent and therefore he is not liable as a damager but he must pay for the benefit that he derived. Therefore, if B's loss is greater than A's monetary gain, B will not recover his entire loss.
The benefit that one gains because someone saved him from a loss is called mavriach ari—chasing away a lion. Tosafos in BK (58A) explains that one is liable for this benefit if the loss was fairly certain. We note that in a different place (Kesubos 107B) Tosafos maintains that one is never liable for the benefit that is considered mavriach ari, but the SA and other poskim rule that the position of Tosafos in BK is authoritative.
Since we have seen that a person who was saved or whose property was saved must pay for the benefit that he received if it came at someone else's expense, we must now examine if that liability applies in your situation where the lives and property of the residents of this settlement were spared at the expense of the car's owner.
This question was never addressed by the Aruch Hashulchan since he only considered whether the one who was saved must pay for damages and he correctly notes that the one who was saved is not liable for damages because he didn't do any act of damage. We, however, are considering whether they are obligated to pay for their benefit as beneficiaries of a yoreid, an aspect that was not considered by the Aruch Hashulchan but was observed by the Ohr Gadol in passing.
A key Gemara (BK 101A) to resolve this issue discusses a monkey that took A's dye and used it to dye B's wool. The monkey was owned by a third party or by no one. The Gemara questions whether B is obligated to pay A because he is now keeping A's dye, similar to one who holds stolen property. Even though B didn't steal anything, perhaps he must pay because he is holding onto A's dye.
Tosafos asks that there would seem to be a different and non-controversial reason why B must pay A: because the benefit that B gained from now having dyed wool, which is worth more than wool that was not dyed, came at A's expense. B should be liable like the owner of the sheep who had to pay the owner of the grain because his gain came at the expense of the grain owner.
The second answer of Tosafos agrees in principle that this situation is similar to the sheep and the grain, but says that the benefit of having dyed wool is not sufficient to require payment. (Why this is so is quite difficult since the wool is worth more. Since this question is not pertinent to our issue, we will suffice by noting that this question is addressed by the Kovetz Shiurim (BK 150).)
The first answer of Tosafos establishes a very basic principle in the laws governing when a person must pay for benefits. He says that only where the sheep used the grain in order to prevent themselves from being damaged is their owner liable. In the case of the monkey, since the owner of the wool did not take the dye himself, he is not liable to pay the dye's owner for the benefit that he derived from his dye. Thus, Tosafos is ruling that if C uses B's property in order to benefit A, A is not liable to B for the benefit that he gained even though it came at B's expense.
This is critical to your question since even though the settlement's residents benefited at the expense of the car's owner, they didn't take the benefit from the car owner. Rather, it was given to them by the one who borrowed the car. The borrower is analogous to the monkey and the residents are like the owner of the wool and the car's owner is like the owner of the dye. Therefore, if one follows the first answer of Tosafos the residents of the town are not obligated to pay for their benefit, whereas according to Tosafos' second answer they are liable.
The Shach (391, 2) notes that the Rosh and Maharshal only cite the first answer, implying that they consider it the authoritative answer. However, he objects and rules that since Tosafos also gave a second answer it is an unresolved question whether one can rely on the first answer. Therefore, according to the Rosh, Maharshal and Shach we cannot obligate the town's residents to reimburse the car's owner for his loss. The only difference is that according to the Shach if the owner has something that belongs to the residents he can keep it as compensation, whereas according to the Maharshal he cannot.
We note that in many cases there is an additional reason we cannot obligate the beneficiary to pay. The reason is because often the loss is not critical to save the victim. For instance, in the case where the Hatzolah driver damaged a parked car, if the parked car did not block the road and was only damaged because of the haste of the Hatzolo driver, one could not obligate the person whose life was saved to pay. The reason is that since the damages were not necessary in order to save his life, the victim is not considered a beneficiary of the damages. While Chazal absolved the driver from paying for the damages, that does not constitute a reason to obligate the one who was saved to cover the damages.
In our case however, the damages were a byproduct of the salvation of the settlement's residents. Therefore, this reason would not apply and we only have the first reason.
In conclusion: The residents are not obligated to cover the car owner's loss. It would be nice of them to make some contribution because of their hakoras hatov, but they have no halachic obligation.
