The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 27b), in its discussion of the propriety of risky medical procedures, cites the story of the four Metzoraim deliberating their course of action. Shomron was suffering from a terrible drought and the Metzoraim realized that if they remained in the besieged city of Shomron they would soon die of starvation. They thought that it would be prudent for them to enter the camp of the enemy, for even if the Arameans would kill them immediately, they would have died shortly anyway if they had remained in the camp of Israel. It was worth risking immediate death because of the possibility that the Arameans would pity them and feed them, thereby allowing them to live much longer than if they had remained among their own people.
The Gemara applies the reasoning and actions of the four Metzoraim to a problem faced in the time of the Gemara. In many periods, pagan doctors harbored enormous ill will towards Jews and posed a grave threat to their Jewish patients. Chazal therefore forbade using pagan doctors. However, the Gemara concludes that if a patient will soon die within a short time and no Jewish doctor is able to heal him, he may visit the pagan doctor with the hope of curing his illness, despite the grave risk involved.
The Gemara sanctions assuming the risk of immediate death by the hands of the pagan doctor despite the fact that the patient would have certainly lived for a brief time without visiting this doctor, asserting that “LeChayei Shaah Lo Chaishinan,” we are not concerned about a very brief amount of life. The basis of this assertion, states the Gemara, is the above-cited story in the Tanach about the four Metzoraim.
Two questions regarding this Gemara. First, the Gemara’s assertion that “LeChayei Shaah Lo Chaishinan” seems astonishing in light of the Gemara’s teaching elsewhere (Yoma 85a) that we may violate Shabbos in order to preserve Chayei Shaah. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 329:4) codifies this rule and the Biur Halacha adds that this rule applies even if the patient will not be able to do anything meaningful with the short period of life gained as a result of the efforts made to save him.
Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 27b s.v. LeChayei) and the Taz (Yoreh Deah 155:2) answer that in both Talmudic passages the operating principle is to act in the best interest of the patient. On one hand, we violate Shabbos in order to allow a patient to live a bit longer. In this case, concern for Chayei Shaah is in the patient’s best interest. On the other hand, the Gemara tolerates risking Chayei Shaah in the hope that the patient will be cured and live for a considerable amount of time. In this situation, risking Chayei Shaah is also in the best interest of the patient. For further discussion of the “best interest of the patient” standard in the context of Chayei Shaah, see the Tiferet Yisrael (Yoma 8:3, s.v. Yachin).
The second question is why the Gemara bases its conclusion on the thought process and actions of these four Metzoraim who were not righteous. Chazal believe that Hashem afflicts people with leprosy because of certain sins that they violated (see Arachin 15b-16a). Moreover, Chazal (Sanhedrin 107b) identify these four Metzoraim as Geichazi and his three sons.
We may answer that although these four Metzoraim were not reputable individuals, the Tanach seems to approve of their actions. Indeed, the action of the four Metzoraim led to the salvation of Shomron. Moreover, the very fact that the Tanach (so uncharacteristically) records the thought process of the four Metzoraim, seems to signal the Tanach’s approval of their thought process and actions (although not of the four Metzoraim as individuals).
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvos Igrot Moshe Y.D. 3:36) writes that Halacha allows prudent human judgment to determine when it is permissible to engage in risky medical procedures. Indeed, the Halacha, in general, looks to prudent human judgments to establish the norm regarding which behaviors involve tolerable risk (Keivan DeDashu Beih Rabbim Shomer Peta’im HaShem – see Yevamos 12b and Niddah 31a). Accordingly, although the four Metzoraim were not Torah scholars, their logic reflects prudent human judgment (and proved successful), and therefore a Halachic principle may be derived from their thought pattern and actions.
May a Metzora, whom the Torah requires to dwell "alone" (13:46), may reside and interact with fellow Metzoraim?
Does the Torah refer to actual solitude and isolation, or merely to his separation from non-Metzoraim? The haftara for Parashas Metzora, tells of four Metzoraim residing together outside the city of Shomron (Melachim II 7:3), which would appear to prove that Metzoraim are, in fact, permitted to live and interact with one another.
Why, did the Gemara (Sanhedrin 107b) feel compelled to identify these four Metzoraim as Geichazi and his sons? The Eil Ha-miluim explained that Metzoraim are forbidden from residing with one another. The Gemara (Erchin 16b) comments that the Torah requires a Metzora to live in isolation because tzaraas generally results from the sin of lashon ha-ra, gossip and negative speech about others, which breaks friendships and marriages. The Metzora is punished for causing people to separate from one another by living himself in isolation. Thus, he concluded that these Metzoraim must have been stricken not for lashon ha-ra, but due to the curse of Elisha, and for this reason they were permitted to live together outside the city. Thus, Metzoraim are generally forbidden to reside even with one another, and must live in complete isolation, except in situations where it can be ascertained that the condition did not result from lashon ha-ra.
Tiferes Yehonatan claims that the four Metzoraim outside the city of Shomron were not stricken with halakhic tzaraas. Elisha had cursed Geichazi by declaring that "the tzaraas of Naaman shall adhere to you and your offspring" (Melakhim II 5:27). Geichazi's condition was not standard tzaras, but rather a special tzaraas related to the non-Jew Naaman, whose condition was not connected to the laws of tum'a and tahara, which do not apply to gentiles. Conceivably, the Tif'eres Yehonatan claims, if Na'aman's condition was transferred to Geichazi and his sons, then they, too, suffered from a physical condition that did not meet the halakhic criteria of tzaraas. They were driven from the city of Shomron not because of the halakhic requirement that a Metzora live in isolation, but rather as a medical precaution to prevent any further spreading of the illness. The laws of formal tzaraas thus did not apply, and for this reason they were permitted to live and interact with one another. According to this approach, then, a Metzora is indeed required to live in complete isolation, and may not interact even with other Metzoraim; and these four Metzoraim during the siege of Shomron were not stricken with halakhic tzaraas.
However, Rashi, the Radak and Metzudas Dovid, all comment that these Metzoraim resided outside the city of Shomron in fulfillment of the Torah's requirement that a Metzora live in isolation ("badad yeishev mi-chutz la-machaneh" – Vayikra 13:46). Clearly, these four were formally declared to be halakhic Metzoraim and were thus required by Torah law to reside outside the city's walls.
A number of Acharonim raised the question of why this command would apply to the city of Shomron, in light of the provision that Metzoraim are banished only from cities that had been walled during the time of Yehoshua's conquest of the Land of Israel. The city of Shomron was built many centuries after Yehoshua, during the reign of Omri, and the question thus arises as to why the four Metzoraim were required to live outside the city.
Rabbi Akiva Eiger suggests that the city of Shomron had perhaps existed even before Omri's purchase and development of the area. Quite possibly, then, there had, indeed, been a wall surrounding the city of Shomron already from the time of Yehoshua, and for this reason the four Metzoraim were required to leave the city.
Rav Yaakov Ettlinger cites the Gemara's comment in Sanhedrin 102b that Omri was blessed with a successful kingship despite his impiety "because he added a metropolis in the Land of Israel." This comment strongly suggests that Omri actually founded a new city, and not merely expand a preexisting city, as Rabbi Akiva Eiger had suggested. Perhaps, Omri built the city of Shomron with the intention that it would serve as the Northern Kingdom's equivalent to Jerusalem, and perhaps the authorities in Shomron imposed upon the city the standards demanded of walled cities despite the fact that it did not exist during the time of Yehoshua.
Ha-ketav Ve-ha-kabbala (to Vayikra 14:40), concludes that Metzoraim are barred only from cities that were walled from the time of Yehoshua. The Rambam, too, speaks only of walled cities in Eretz Yisrael, without requiring that the city was walled in Yehoshua's time (Hilchos Tumas Tzaraas 10:7).