Halacha Discussions from the Incident of the Four Metzoraim
The Gemara (Avodah Zarah 27b), in its discussion of the propriety of risky medical procedures, cites the story of the four Metzoraim deliberating their course of action. Shomron was suffering from a terrible drought and the Metzoraim realized that if they remained in the besieged city of Shomron they would soon die of starvation. They thought that it would be prudent for them to enter the camp of the enemy, for even if the Arameans would kill them immediately, they would have died shortly anyway if they had remained in the camp of Israel. It was worth risking immediate death because of the possibility that the Arameans would pity them and feed them, thereby allowing them to live much longer than if they had remained among their own people.
The Gemara applies the reasoning and actions of the four Metzoraim to a problem faced in the time of the Gemara. In many periods, pagan doctors harbored enormous ill will towards Jews and posed a grave threat to their Jewish patients. Chazal therefore forbade using pagan doctors. However, the Gemara concludes that if a patient will soon die within a short time and no Jewish doctor is able to heal him, he may visit the pagan doctor with the hope of curing his illness, despite the grave risk involved.
The Gemara sanctions assuming the risk of immediate death by the hands of the pagan doctor despite the fact that the patient would have certainly lived for a brief time without visiting this doctor, asserting that “LeChayei Shaah Lo Chaishinan,” we are not concerned about a very brief amount of life. The basis of this assertion, states the Gemara, is the above-cited story in the Tanach about the four Metzoraim.
Two questions regarding this Gemara. First, the Gemara’s assertion that “LeChayei Shaah Lo Chaishinan” seems astonishing in light of the Gemara’s teaching elsewhere (Yoma 85a) that we may violate Shabbos in order to preserve Chayei Shaah. Indeed, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 329:4) codifies this rule and the Biur Halacha adds that this rule applies even if the patient will not be able to do anything meaningful with the short period of life gained as a result of the efforts made to save him.
Tosafos (Avodah Zarah 27b s.v. LeChayei) and the Taz (Yoreh Deah 155:2) answer that in both Talmudic passages the operating principle is to act in the best interest of the patient. On one hand, we violate Shabbos in order to allow a patient to live a bit longer. In this case, concern for Chayei Shaah is in the patient’s best interest. On the other hand, the Gemara tolerates risking Chayei Shaah in the hope that the patient will be cured and live for a considerable amount of time. In this situation, risking Chayei Shaah is also in the best interest of the patient. For further discussion of the “best interest of the patient” standard in the context of Chayei Shaah, see the Tiferet Yisrael (Yoma 8:3, s.v. Yachin).
The second question is why the Gemara bases its conclusion on the thought process and actions of these four Metzoraim who were not righteous. Chazal believe that Hashem afflicts people with leprosy because of certain sins that they violated (see Arachin 15b-16a). Moreover, Chazal (Sanhedrin 107b) identify these four Metzoraim as Geichazi and his three sons.
We may answer that although these four Metzoraim were not reputable individuals, the Tanach seems to approve of their actions. Indeed, the action of the four Metzoraim led to the salvation of Shomron. Moreover, the very fact that the Tanach (so uncharacteristically) records the thought process of the four Metzoraim, seems to signal the Tanach’s approval of their thought process and actions (although not of the four Metzoraim as individuals)
Rav Moshe Feinstein (Teshuvos Igrot Moshe Y.D. 3:36) writes that Halacha allows prudent human judgment to determine when it is permissible to engage in risky medical procedures. Indeed, the Halacha, in general, looks to prudent human judgments to establish the norm regarding which behaviors involve tolerable risk (Keivan DeDashu Beih Rabbim Shomer Peta’im HaShem – see Yevamos 12b and Niddah 31a). Accordingly, although the four Metzoraim were not Torah scholars, their logic reflects prudent human judgment (and proved successful), and therefore a Halachic principle may be derived from their thought pattern and actions.
