(דברים יד,א) :לָמֵת עֵינֵיכֶם בֵין קָרְ חָה תָשִׂימוּ-וְלֹא תִתְּגֹּדְּדוּ לֹּא יכֶם קאֱלֹ 'לה אַתֶם בָנִׂים
Chazal derive from this passuk which “prohibits cutting oneself in mourning” another issur – לא תעשו אגודות אגודות- don’t splinter into different groups. This prohibition in some circumstances binds people to the practices of the community to prevent them from splitting into factions.
The main sugya is found in Yevamos 13b-14a, and also appears in the beginning of Megillah. In the contexts of discussing a dispute between Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai concerning some rules in Yibum, the Gemara wonders how we can have different parts of the community practicing different things, as it seems to violate this concept of לא תתגודדו . One example is the institution of Krias Megillah, where Chazal allowed people to read the Megillah (depending on location) anywhere from the 11th to the 15th of Adar. Another example, which we saw was the Gemara’s acceptance of varying customs concerning whether one should or should not work in the morning of Erev Pesach. The third example, which is the context in Yevamos is the opposing positions of Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai about some Yibum issues, assuming that Beis Shamai actually implemented their position in practice making a potential problem in marrying between the two groups.
The Gemara raises several distinctions to justify these practices. One possible distinction is between cases of minhag and cases of issur. In the former there is no לא תתגודדו and in the latter there is. This would remove the problem from Pesachim. The Rishonim differ on whether there was actually a dispute, with one position thinking that people cannot even vary regarding customs and the other limiting the prohibition to different practices on issurim. Ritva holds that no one applies the prohibition to minhag, while Tosfos thinks they did.
EXPLANATIONS:
The Netziv (and others) suggests this distinction depends on the two explanations for the prohibition offered by the Rishonim. The Rambam suggests it was meant to prevent machlokes. Rashi argues that it was to prevent the Torah from looking like two Toros, a phrase taken from Sanhedrin 88 where the Gemara bemoans the fact that the students of Beis Hillel and Beis Shamai were derelict in their studies and thus were not able to resolve dispute, leading to the development of two separate camps. Netziv argues that while people may fight about minhagim, different customs do not imply that there are two Toros – only varying Halachic practices do. Of course, one could argue that people do fight about minhagim – allowing the Rambam’s svara to explain both positions easily.
LEHALACHA, the Rama rules that there is לא תתגודדו even by minhagim, and the Magen Avraham argues. Most poskim follow the Magen Avraham, which allows R. Ovadiah and R. Moshe to explain why Sfardim and Ashkenazim can have different minhagim.
Other distinctions raised by the Gemara are either:
- the prohibition only applies when there are two camps in one town, but different towns can have different practices or
- even within one town there is only a prohibition for one Beis Din to fail to come to a conclusion. Different courts can have different opinions.
R. Ovadiah notes that many Rishonim follow the latter position, and he therefore claims that Ashkenazim and Sfardim in one town are like two courts (as they follow the Rama and Beis Yosef), making their divergent practices mutar. The Rambam rules like the first position, but R. Ovadiah claims that even he would agree in the case of Ashkenazim and Sfardim where everyone knows about the different mesoros and will not fight about it. [R. Ovadiah as we have mentioned seems partially driven by a desire to defend Sfardim from Ashekenazi hegemony, especially the attempt to formally force Sfardim to accept Ashkenazi psak. He accuses R. Uziel, the Sfardi chief rabbi who was willing to give in for unity of Klal Yisrael of allowing love to corrupt his mind.] Note that R. Moshe rules similarly, but adds that a Chazan should follow the minhag of the shul, even if there is no problem of people following their own minhagim privately.
Many poskim suggest based on the above that the issur applies primarily to poskim. However, once poskim have failed to agree, then the laity who follow their rulings would not have a prohibition.
