Text 6
A sin-offering and a guilt-offering may be brought only for a sin. They may not be brought because of a pledge or a vow. [Hence,] if one says: "I promise to bring a sin-offering" or "...a guilt-offering," his statements are of no consequence.
Rambam, Laws of Sacrifices 14:8
As the law explains, a person may not simply vow to bring a sin offering. A sin offering can only be brought on account of an actual transgression, and when there is none, his oath to bring such a sacrifice is meaningless.
However, though one may not bring a sin offering as a random pledge, he may do so to atone for another person’s sin. This second point is presented in the continuation of the law:
Text 7
[When] one says: "I promise to bring the sin-offering, burnt-offering, guilt-offering, and peace-offering of so-and-so." If that person agrees, he may allow him to bring those sacrifices for him and he [that person] receives atonement thereby.
Rambam, Laws of Sacrifices 14:10
This idea of one individual being able to bring a sacrifice for another reveals two innovative points:
- From the perspective of the laws of making an oath: When a person declares, “I promise to bring a sin offering...” his pledges are of no consequence, as there exists no standing obligation to bring the offering. However, in a situation where the individual says, "I promise to bring the sin-offering...of so-and-so," being that for this second individual an obligation for the sacrifice does exist, the person’s oath is valid, and he is thereby required to bring the offering on account of this pledge.
- From the perspective of atonement: Even though the obligation to bring the sacrifice falls only on the person who sinned or is in need of atonement, the Torah nevertheless makes a revolutionary ruling that one individual can bring atonement for another individual’s sin. Since every Jew is a guarantor for his fellow, he can therefore bring a sacrifice in his friend’s stead, and affect atonement for his friend’s sin!
This concept finds its source in the Talmud:
Text 8
All Israel are guarantors one for another.
Talmud, Shavuos 39a
Because every individual Jew is responsible for his fellow, he has the ability to bring a sacrifice that will actually atone for his fellow’s sin.
Making it all clear
This is the focal difference between these two seemingly contradictory laws regarding one who takes upon sacrifice of another, and the clarification of first question on the Rambam as well.
Rambam had written each of the variant rulings in a different category of laws:
When Rambam stated that “if the afflicted person or the woman is poor, the one who took the vow should bring the sacrifices of a poor person,” this was mentioned in the section of the Laws of Sacrifices, regarding the laws of fulfilling his oath.
Rambam therefore said that the patron must bring the sacrifice according to the financial status of the original individual who was obligated in the sacrifice—the pauper. For, as a result of the patron’s oath, he became bound by the sacrifice of this person—the sacrifice of a poor individual.
Nonetheless, concerning the Laws of Atonement, he is not bringing the sacrifice in order to fulfil the obligation of his own oath, but is offering this sacrifice in order to affect atonement for the individual who requires it—in this case, the Metzorah who was afflicted by tzara’as.
For this reason, Rambam rules in the chapter concerning these laws, that even if the patron was wealthy and the afflicted person was poor, “he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man, for the person who took the vow has the financial capacity.”
Being that in general, a rich person who seeks atonement must bring a more expensive offering and this patron is wealthy, he must therefore bring the more expensive sacrifice.
The reason is that when a Jew absolves the duty of his fellow as a guarantor for him, the patron is now not only fulfilling an oath, but he, so-to-speak, takes on the obligation of the person who requires a sacrifice, the Metzorah. It is as if he himself had sinned, and needs to atone in the appropriate manner according to his personal financial means.
Thus, if the one accepting his fellow’s offering is wealthy, even if the original Metzorah or woman was poor, he must bring a sacrifice of a wealthy man.
The second statement
In the same vein, Rambam’s second statement in the laws of atonement and his seemingly inaccurate wording is clarified as well.
Rambam wrote that if a pauper took responsibility for the sacrifice of a rich person, he must bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man, “for the person who took the vow obligated himself to bring the sacrifices of a wealthy man.”
Above, the question was posed as to why Rambam wrote that the reason for this requirement was because of the oath, and did not write that the reason was due to the original obligation of the wealthy individual. According to what was explained above however, this can be understood as well.
Rambam’s intention in expressing the law in this manner is due to the nature of the laws of oaths, as mentioned above:
Although, from the standpoint of atonement one follows the status of the person who is actually bringing the sacrifice (being that he takes on the status of the original person upon himself), from the perspective of the oath, he must fulfill the oath exactly as the afflicted person had pledged.
So, while from a perspective of atonement he would only need to bring the sacrifice of a poor person—although the individual who needs atonement is wealthy—from the standpoint of an oath he must bring the sacrifice of a wealthy individual.
Since the individual stated, “I take responsibility for the sacrifices of this afflicted person," and that individual was wealthy, he must bring the sacrifice of a wealthy individual.
Not enough
This explanation is not adequate though.
In both statements Rambam writes that the individual who makes an oath brings the sacrifice on account of the individual whom he made the oath regarding. In both situations his sacrifices are not only because of an oath, but to absolve his need for atonement.
It would therefore stand to reason that the aspect of atonement as well transfers to the poor patron. It is this for this reason that he must bring the sacrifice of the rich individual, although he himself is poor.
This, however, needs clarification. Why, when a poor individual brings the sacrifice for a wealthy individual to atone for him, must the sacrifice be according to the means of the wealthy individual?
“Inheriting” the means
This difficulty is resolved though, through understanding the following idea:
Although the one who made the oath to take upon the sacrifice of the Metzorah is an indigent, and the sacrifice should thus be established accordingly, nevertheless, since through his oath he became obligated in the sacrifice of a rich individual, it is considered as if he too has the ability to bring the sacrifice of a rich man.
When the poor person accepts to bring the sacrifice of a wealthy individual, it is considered as if he too is wealthy. He must therefore bring a more expensive sacrifice, as the wealthy person would have done, even though in actuality he is poor.
This is because the actual oath motivates the person to have the ability to bring the more expensive sacrifice.
The Talmud demonstrates the above idea as follows:
Text 9
I have sworn, and I will keep Your righteous judgments. But is he not under a perpetual oath from Mount Sinai? — But what [R. Giddal] teaches us is that one may stimulate himself. R. Giddal also said in Rav’s name: He who says, ‘I will rise early to study this chapter or this tractate,’ has vowed a great vow to the G-d of Israel. But he is under a perpetual oath from Mount Sinai, and an oath cannot fall upon another? Then [again] if he informs us that a person may thus stimulate himself.
Talmud, Nedarim 8a
When a person accepts upon himself the sacrifice of a wealthy individual, this itself gives him the ability to indeed find the means to indeed bring the sacrifice of a wealthy individual.
The lesson
Tehilim 119:106.
From this can be learned a tremendous lesson concerning the strength of Jewish unity.
Firstly, we can see the extent of the effect one can have on their fellow, in that through his own sacrifice he can bring atonement to another.
An individual is able to not only bring a sacrifice for his fellow when his fellow is poor, or doesn’t have the ability to bring it on his own, but even when the afflicted person is wealthy and has the means to bring the offering on his own, his friend can bring it in his stead.
This manifests in that when the one who made the oath to fulfill the sacrifice of his fellow, it is as if he himself is in need of atonement and we therefore follow what he can afford; it is as if he himself is obligated in the sacrifice.
Text 10
The verse states “You shall neither take revenge from nor bear a grudge against the members of your people.” When a person is cutting meat and he cuts himself, should he then cut his other hand?!
Talmud Yerushalmi, Nedarim 9:4
This is the true degree of the unity of the Jewish people—that we are all one corpus. It is for this reason that when there is a blemish in one Jew, it extends to his fellow; because another person’s pain, is in truth, his own.
This idea is expressed in the law that when a Jew gives of his own ability to affect an atonement in his fellow, although he is an indigent, the Torah places him in the category of a wealthy person, since they are all in truth like one individual.
Vayikra 19:18.
Were he himself to have been a Metzorah, he would not be obligated to bring the sacrifice of a wealthy person, but when he accepts the responsibility of another, he himself is considered rich!
When a person does indeed accept the sacrifice of a wealthy person, this opens channels that he too should be wealthy.
The story is told about the Previous Lubavitcher Rebbe: Once he requested from an individual a certain sum of money to print the works of the third Lubavitcher Rebbe. The individual from whom he requested the donation did not have the means, but he nevertheless accepted the project upon himself. The Rebbe blessed him and after a short time he became wealthy and was able to fulfill the full sum of the printing.
The resolution to give more than he was able to give itself, is what opened new channels for this individual, so that he could fulfill his resolution.
So too, in our scenario. When the Almighty sees that a person goes out of his limitations—notwithstanding that he himself is a pauper—and attempts to atone for his fellow who is rich, G-d opens new channels for him so that he can fulfill his obligation as a rich individual.
(Based on Likutei Sichos 27, Metzorah 1, reworked by Rabbi Dovid Markel. To see other projects and to partner in our work, see: www.Neirot.com.)
See Igros Kodesh, Previous Lubavitcher Rebbe 8:513.
