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Torah Musings

Rules of Legal Documents

  • Tsav
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Mar 26, 2024
by R. Gidon Rothstein

Parshat Tzav

We don’t much write shetarot, legal documents, anymore, other than a ketubah when getting married and (if we need to) a get for divorce. For business dealings, I suspect we tend to use local contract law. Making Choshen Mishpat 61 largely irrelevant in most cases. I chose to summarize it here nonetheless for its emphasis on local custom as a factor in how we evaluate the legality of documents. I think it an underemphasized undercurrent of financial halachah, how much is amenable to custom.

Authorization Assumes the Custom

Siman 61 of AH Choshen Mishpat starts with what the scribe may assume the Jew who engaged him to write a document intended to include. The authorization is enacted with a kinyan sudar, where the scribe has the Jew acquire an object of the sofer’s, such as a pen or handkerchief, in return for which the Jew conveys to the scribe his right to write the document [it’s a sort of kinyan chalipin, where a trade can happen with only one side of the trade present right then].

We understand the authorization to mean the scribe should include in the shetar whatever local custom generally includes, such as: a declaration the parties had nullified any prior moda’ot (a moda’ah was a way to circumvent coercion, by announcing ahead of time one does not intend whatever one is about to do. Here, the parties are nullifying any of those, to assure the other side this is not any kind of a fake-out transaction.)

[Along those lines, my mother, hareini kapparat mishkavah, used to tell a story about when my father, a”h, worked as a corporate lawyer, was part of a long-negotiated deal that eventually came to signing with a real estate developer, sadly still a very prominent man. Concluding a long (and expensive) negotiation, they signed the contracts, and went about their business. Except that, at some point after, the real estate guy urged the lawyers to look more carefully at the contract, where instead of his signature, he had written “not agreed.” The bittul moda’ah, nullification of prior announcements, as well as the next clause we are about to see, was to avoid such tricks.]

The sofer would also be expected to write that the handshake that solemnified the deal, in line with local custom, was not an asmachta, where the other party did not really commit; and that all these declarations were fully intended, not pro forma because this is what is written in a shetar.

[I’m not sure if he or anyone saw the irony in the formal custom to include in a document the declaration that all these matters were not written as a formality.]

The Silent Shetar

Where the shetar did not include those, Shach held we act as if they were written, as long as the borrower or seller knew the usual form for such documents. Urim ve-Tumim and Nesivos, on the other hand, thought we had to suspect the parties to this transaction had specifically agreed not to include them.

AH points out the latter view can support its claim based on the Gemara’s discussion of achrayut ta’ut sofer, whether we assume a transaction includes achrayut even if it was not written in the shetar. Achrayut places a lien on all real estate a borrower (or seller) has at the moment of a loan/sale; should the borrower default, the lender can collect the real estate, even if someone else bought it in the interim. The Gemara seems to favor the view that omitting this clause doesn’t change the rule, because people do not lend money without some security.

Barring that specific Talmudic rule, it seems we would have taken silence to indicate this shetar chose other standards than local custom, Urim ve-Tumim and Nesivos would argue. Nonetheless, AH favored Shach’s view, thought achrayut was an exception, we might have thought it had to be made explicit despite local custom, since it allows taking property from unrelated parties. Whatever affects only the two people involved is and should be ruled by local custom (unless the shetar says explicitly otherwise).

New Local Customs

In se’if three, AH says that we follow even innovative new local customs of shetarot, as long as they do not violate Torah law directly. He gives an example of the latter, a shetar cannot allow a lender to seize property even in the borrower’s absence, without permission from a court, and/or without an official appraisal, because the Torah permits taking collateral only in court, from siman 97. Unless there is a shortage of judges, or common custom says to take collateral without official appraisal, in which case the Torah does leave the option for a borrower to concede the lender this right, and then it would/could be included in a shetar.

Communal Rules

Communities can also make their own rules, such as that all shetarot must be written by the local scribe. [AH thinks this would be to avoid forgeries; I can also imagine doing it to be sure there is enough business to maintain the local scribe.] For the forgery possibility, an involved party could write the document in his own hand (or, says Sema, sign it himself), without witnesses, because it becomes a sort of hoda’at ba’al davar, admission of the facts by the concerned, legally stronger in establishing facts than witnesses.

Another longstanding custom, se’if five, was for a Jew to authorize a scribe and witnesses, with a formal act such as a handkerchief transfer, and have the busy scribe write the main points, signed by the witnesses, to later convert into a full document. These notes do not make a shetar, because they lack aspects custom requires. Others think that if the person committed, and they wrote enough to know his/her commitment, it, too, is already a shetar.

Bearer Bonds

AH in se’if six knew of communities with a specific ban on bearer bonds, where the shetar says anyone in possession of this document can collect from the named borrower, and provides harsha’ah, power of attorney, to such a person (BY says the harsha’ah is unnecessary, for reasons we will see below). If communal custom outlaws it, it will not work. Where it can work, AH points out some interesting nuances.

First, Dagul me-Revavah (comments on SA by R. Yechezkel Landau, rabbi of Prague, better known by the name of his responsa, Noda Bi-Yehuda) thought such a document is based on shelichut, being the messenger of the original lender, and non-Jews cannot serve as halachic messengers. So non-Jews could not collect a loan with this kind of document.

Almost two generations later, Nesivos ha-Mishpat disputed the idea. He thought the shetar codified the borrower’s choice to obligate him/herself to whoever. He does agree whoever is collecting must have been born at the time of the original shetar, because halachah does not recognize transfers of ownership with or to a not-yet-existent entity.

The Care To Take

Se’ifim seven and eight present two factors to keep in mind when writing a shetar. First, courts will read such documents according to the usual meaning of words in the language in which it was written, with the usual halachic rules and assumptions around such words and transactions. A party to a shetar cannot later claim not to have understood what was happening, what commitment s/he was making.

[A personal aside: the Gemara is clearly opposed to lawyers, seeing them as finding ways to help people work the system to their advantage, legally but improperly. I recognize the concern, but also wonder about situations such as this one, where we can easily imagine people who do not know the ins and outs of halachah or language, then find themselves having agreed to what they did not mean to agree.] AH places the burden of avoiding this problem on the judges, who need to remember the necessity of being sure they know the full context of a transaction and its conditions before they rule on a case.

The other concern has to do with why it used to be important to balance a checkbook (for those who remember checks). Even if a shetar is very old, the lender has not tried to collect the loan despite suffering from poverty, and comes now to collect after the original borrower passed away (raising the suspicion it is a subterfuge the heirs will not spot although the original borrower would have), the shetar remains valid as long as he can provide an amatla, a convincing reason for waiting.

Here too, AH reminds courts to check carefully, and to recuse themselves if they suspect but cannot prove there is chicanery afoot. [Another important halachic idea, that a Jew should make sure not to be part of misconduct even if he cannot prove there is misconduct going on.]

Why I Try to Write S/he

Se’if ten reminds us of what the general use of “he” in the English language can make us forget. AH denies any difference between men and women for civil law, cases with money. Women differ from men only in a subset of ritual obligations; for all other halachah, they are the same as men. If a woman becomes obligated to take an oath in court, she must take an oath in court. If the law says the courts should force her to do something, the courts are to force her to do something.

The very real distinctions in how halachah treats women in some areas can fool us into letting them spread to other areas. Hence the importance of reminding ourselves of the many places where gender has no impact on how we treat people. Such as for money and loans in court.

No Penalty Commitments

A Jew can commit to repay another’s expenses if s/he fails to act in some expected way, but cannot commit to penalize him/herself, to pay more (“I’ll double your expenses if I don’t show on time”). Such a promise is considered an asmachta, a commitment the person never thought would come to fruition, and therefore never sincerely committed to uphold. In such cases, the Jew would have to pay the expenses, the promise to pay those is valid, not the extra.

AH points out that in such cases even if the shetar says this is not an asmachta commitment, the asmachta element is too explicit to avoid it. Shach thought any promise to compensate for profits lost because of the first person’s failures would still be an asmachta, because such profits are not well-defined. AH limits the claim; he thinks a guarantee to make up losses to a person’s regular income, even if future income, would not be an asmachta.

What can work, even for Shach, is a kinyan before a qualified court (a beit din chashuv, an important court), or giving a gift starting now (an issue clarified more fully in Siman 207, he tells us).

Three more se’ifim cover cases that seem to me unlikely in today’s world, so I will leave them for those who study every paragraph of AH. For now, we’ve had what I hope is an interesting tour of shetarot and some of the halachic/communal custom issues they raise.

Next time, proper bodily cleanliness during prayer.

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