Reciting Sheva Berachos on the Night of the Eighth Day, When the Meal Began on the Seventh Day
Question: It is quite common for the final Sheva Berachos meal to be hosted by close friends or family of the chosan and kallah. Out of joy and excitement for the simcha, the meal often extends over many hours — sometimes even continuing past nightfall. The question then arises: Once night has fallen and it is halachically the eighth day (motza’ei the seventh), may Sheva Berachos still be recited, or is it considered outside the time frame of the shivas yemei hamishteh [seven days of feasting]?
Answer: Many of the gedolei haposkim rule that if the Sheva Berachos meal began on the seventh day but extended into the night of the eighth, the Sheva Berachos must be recited only during the daytime of the seventh day. They may not be recited during bein hashmashos and certainly not once it is halachically nighttime on the eighth day.
This ruling is based on the pesak of several major achronim and poskim. R’ Akiva Eiger (Even HaEzer 62:6) and the Sha’arei Teshuvah (Orach Chaim 188:7) cite the Ginas Veradim, who writes that if a Sheva Berachos meal took place on the last day of the shivas yemei hamishteh, even if the meal ended before shki’ah but the birchas nisuin was delayed until after shki’ah, the Sheva Berachos may no longer be recited.
Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt”l explained the distinction between this halachah and the halachah of saying Retzei in bentching after shki’ah on Shabbos:
In the case of Sheva Berachos, after shkiah, the chosan and kallah no longer halachically carry the status of chosan and kallah for this purpose, and therefore the berachos may no longer be said. However, when it comes to mentioning Shabbos in bentching, it suffices that the meal was a seudah shel Shabbos, even if the bentching is said after shkiah.
Rav Elyashiv zt”l therefore ruled that Sheva Berachos should not be recited after shkiah on the seventh day, even if that day falls on Shabbos. He also related that the Klausenberger Rebbe zt”l once invited him to the final Sheva Berachos meal for his daughter’s wedding in order to honor him with a berachah, along with Rav Dov Weiss shlit”a. Rav Elyashiv declined the invitation, explaining that he could not attend unless he was assured that the meal would end before shki’ah. The Klausenberger Rebbe zt”l responded that he would ensure it concluded in time.
This was also the pesak of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt”l. See also Otzar HaPoskim (Even HaEzer 62:6), which brings an extensive discussion of this issue.
Similarly, Rav Nissim Karelitz zt”l said in the name of the Ponovezher Rav zt”l that Sheva Berachos should not be recited after shki’ah on the seventh day. He compared it to a case where the choson leaves the room during the meal, in which case Sheva Berachos cannot be recited. He added that there is no distinction between weekday meals and seudah shlishis on Shabbos that falls on the seventh day — in all such cases, Sheva Berachos may not be recited once the sun has set.
How Are the Seven Days of Sheva Berachos Counted?
Question: Closely related to the previous discussion, a fundamental question is often asked: From when do we begin counting the shivas yemei hamishteh? Is the count from the start of the meal following the chuppah, or from the time of the chuppah itself?
Answer: The Teshuvos HaRosh (klal 26, siman 2), cited by the Rema (Even HaEzer 62:6), writes that the counting of the seven days begins immediately after the Sheva Berachos recited under the chuppah. The Chelkas Mechokeik (s.k. 7) explains that the Rema, citing the Rosh, is coming to exclude the notion that the seven days begin with the first meal — rather, they begin as soon as the Sheva Berachos are completed under the chuppah. See also the sefer HaMakneh (Even HaEzer 61:5). This view is also followed by the Aruch HaShulchan (62:31) and the Kaf HaChayim (131:69), unlike the opinion of the Teshuvos Knesses Yechezkel, cited in Pischei Teshuvah (12), who holds that the count begins only after the conclusion of the first meal, not from the chuppah. This was also the ruling of the Igros Moshe zt”l, as brought in Teshuvos Divrei Chachamim.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting what is written in the sefer Sova Semachos by Rav Seraya Dublitzky zt”l (1:14), who states that even though the halachah does not follow the Knesses Yechezkel with respect to Sheva Berachos, it is still proper that regarding the other halachos of a choson, such as refraining from melachah [work] or going out alone — to be stringent in accordance with his view, and to count the seven days starting from the night following the chuppah. This view is also echoed in Shu”t Yabi’a Omer, Even HaEzer Vol. 5, siman 7.
However, in the sefer Imrei Ya’akov (Even HaEzer 64, Likkutim 2), he writes that although there are poskim cited in Otzar HaPoskim (62:2) who rule stringently to avoid melachah for seven days starting from that night, nonetheless, halachically, one need not be strict. Since the essence of the chuppah is the act of seclusion (yichud) or the placing under the canopy — as explained by the Chazon Ish (Even HaEzer 63:17) and also by the Taz — even though there are dissenting opinions, given that the prohibition of melachah for a chosan is derabbanan, one may rely on the more lenient position. It seems that this is indeed the common practice — that the issur melachah follows the chuppah and not later at night.
Can A Convert Who Converts After Attending a Wedding Be Counted Towards the Panim Chadashos
Question: At a Sheva Berachos in a yeshiva, some bochurim arrived accompanied by a non-Jew who was in the process of converting. The question arose, if such a person would have been at the wedding, would he be considered panim chadashos if he converted between the wedding and the Sheva Berachos? On one hand, he was present at the wedding and may have contributed to simchas chosan; on the other hand, perhaps as a non-Jew, his presence did not count in this regard, allowing him to now qualify as panim chadashos after his conversion?
Answer: The fundamental question here is, do we say that since he was not Jewish at the time of the wedding, it is as though he did not participate in the wedding.
To clarify this halachic issue, we must first address the underlying rationale for requiring panim chadashos.
The Gemara in Kesubos (7b-8a) discusses the obligation of panim chadashos to recite the Sheva Berachos. The Rishonim debate what this refers to: According to the Rambam (and the first opinion cited in Shulchan Aruch, Even HaEzer 62:7), panim chadashos refers to someone who has not yet heard the berachos under the chuppah. The Rosh and other Rishonim hold that it refers to someone who has not yet participated in the seudah, even if they heard the berachos under the chuppah.
According to both of these reasons, seemingly one could argue that since the convert was a non-Jew at the time of the chuppah and now he is considered to be a different person, it could be considered as if he never heard the berachos, and that he never participated in the meal, as after all he is now a different person.
Indeed, this question was posed to Rav Chaim Kanievsky zt”l, who ruled that the convert can be considered panim chadashos. He quoted the Gemara in Kiddushin (62b), which states: “Initially, she was like a beast, but now [after she is freed], she is an independent mind.”
In other words, her status has fundamentally changed, and she is now a new person halachically.
A similar story involved a man who, r”l, lived together with a non-Jewish woman. He was then chozer b’teshuvah and left her, and even vowed never to return to her. Years later, after studying diligently in yeshiva for twelve years, he was suggested a shidduch with a convert. Upon meeting her, he realized she was the same woman he had vowed to avoid! Rav Chaim ruled that since her status had entirely changed— “Initially, she was like an animal; now she is a person”—she is considered a different individual, and the man was permitted to marry her.
Thus, in the case of the convert attending the Sheva Berachos, his prior presence as a non-Jew is irrelevant, and he is halachically considered a valid panim chadashos.
The Case of the Chazon Who “Thought” that There Was a Choson in Shul and Skipped Out Tachanun
There was a case when someone came to daven in a place where there were a number of minyonim taking place, and on his way in he saw a choson who was in his week of Sheva Berachos. This individual then went to daven for the amud, and when he finished shemonah esrei he immediately said kaddish, and omitted tachanun, as he thought there was a choson in his minyan. After reciting kaddish he realized that there was no choson in sight and that the choson must have attended a different minyan. What is the halachah in this case, may tachanun still be recited even though the chazon said kaddish? If yes, should kaddish be repeated a second time?
L'Horas Nossan
The Shu”t L’Horas Nossan (6:7) discusses a similar question and he writes that although the Beis Yosef (beginning of 131) writes that one shouldn’t speak between the end of shemonah esrei and tachanun as it is one long tefillah, however, the poskim say that bedieved if one did speak, he may still recite tachanun, it’s just that it won’t be as potent.
The Taz in Hilchos Aveilus (Yoreh Deah 376:2) brings in the name of the Roke’ach that we don’t recite tachanun in a beis avel [house of mourning], however, after davening one should make sure to recite tachanun. We see clearly from the Roke’ach, that even if there has been a kaddish interrupting between shemonah esrei and tachanun, it may still be recited.
Practically we don’t rule like this (see Taz in Hilchos Tefillah, Orach Chaim 131 s.k. 9), however, the L’Horas Nossan says that this is specifically by a beis avel when one is exempt from saying tachanun (see Shulchan Aruch 131:4) and since one isn’t supposed to say it after shemoneh esrei, it should no longer be said, as in such a case Chazal never required it. Like the Shulchan Aruch HaRav (131:5) writes: “The place for tachanun is immediately after shemonah esrei, and in a beis avel where we push aside tachanun from being recited in its normal place, we push it aside completely”. However, in our case of the non-existent choson, where the chazon mistakenly recited kaddish and omitted tachanun, everyone would agree that tachanun should be recited, and mistakenly missing it out doesn’t uproot the chiyuv. Especially, after we have seen from the Roke’ach, that even by a beis avel tachanun should be recited later on. When tachanun is omitted with a good reason then there is no need to recite it later, but when it is omitted due to a mistake, then one must make it up.
Based on this, the L’Horas Nossan concludes that tachanun should be recited later, even if one has finished davening, and he adds that kaddish should be recited a second time after tachanun.
R’ Shlomah Zalman Auerbach (Halichos Shlomah Vol. 1, 11:2) also rules that tachanun should be recited. He adds: If krias haTorah has already been recited and the chazon realizes before Ashrei and U’Vo LeTzion, tachanun should be recited then and the tzibbur shouldn’t wait. Although there is room to argue that since this isn’t the ideal place for tachanun, and the chazon is considered to be in the middle of his tefillah until after Ashrei and U’Vo LeTzion (see Mishnah Berurah 123:18), perhaps he should wait, nonetheless it is still best to recite it there.
However, they bring a story with the Chazon Ish (Orchos Rabbeinu, Vol. 3, pg. 225) that one time he was in a minyan and the chazon omitted tachanun and started kaddish, and the Chazon Ish ruled that he should continue, and tachanun should no longer be recited. R’ Chaim Kanievsky zt”l explained this pesak, that since tachanun is a continuation of shemonah esrei like we mentioned from the Beis Yosef, if one interrupts, one has lost the continuation and it should no longer be said.
Conclusion
There is a machlokes haposkim what to do if the chazon accidently skips out tachanun, some say it should still be recited, and some say once it has been skipped there is no going back. Practically I heard from R’ Boruch Dzialowski shlita, that when it comes to shailos in tachanun, we say sofek tachanun lekulah [when doubts arise about whether to say tachanun or not, we rule leniently and omit it] (this is based on a Sha’ar HaTziyun, and a ruling of R’ Chaim Kanievsky zt”l) and therefore, in this case we would not go back.
If One Served Milky Ice Cream at a Meaty Meal and Later Discovered It — Must He/She Inform the Guests?
Question: There was an unfortunate incident when a family hosted a Sheva Berachos and served a tasty meaty meal. For dessert they brought what they thought was pareve ice cream and served it to all the guests. After the guests finished eating and returned home, the hosts were cleaning in the kitchen, and they saw that the containers of ice cream in the garbage had the words “chalavi” [“milky”] written in large letters on them, and they were shocked that they had served milky ice cream to all the guests after serving them a meaty meal. The question that arises is: Since they caused the guests to eat milky within the time frame of eating meaty, are they obligated to inform the guests so that they can do teshuvah for this?
Answer: Before answering whether one must inform them, we must clarify what prohibition was violated, was it a de’O’rasia, a derabbanan, what exactly did they do wrong? The Gemara in Chullin (105a), codified in Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 89:1), states that Chazal prohibited eating dairy products at the same meal as eating meat. This is an issur derabbanan as a matter of harchokah, as the issur de’O’raisa of basar b’chalav applies only if the meat and milk were cooked together over fire. Therefore, even if one eats meat and dairy together when they are cold, one only violates an issur derabbanan. Thus, in our case, the guests were caused to violate an issur derabbanan. The question is whether we need to inform them when they only violated an issur derabbanan.
There is a famous Nesivos HaMishpat (234, Biurim, 3) which says, that if someone transgresses an issur derabbanan b’shogeig [accidentally] no kaporah [atonement] is needed. Since no issur de’O’raisa was violated here, we can say that no kaporah—and thereby no teshuvah—is needed. Based on this principle, the Nesivos explains that in a case where someone purchased food that was forbidden miderabbanan and paid the price of kosher food for it and ate it, the seller does not need to refund the difference between the price of kosher and treif food, because the buyer is considered to have benefited as if they had eaten kosher food.
The reason for this is that with issurei de’O’raisa, the prohibition applies to the cheftza [item] itself, and therefore one who eats it even unknowingly is considered to have eaten inherently forbidden food. But regarding issurei derabbanan, the prohibition doesn't apply to the cheftza itself, but rather only to the gavra [person] upon whom the prohibition to eat falls, while the food itself remains like kosher food. Therefore, one who eats it is only considered to have transgressed that which Chazal forbade them to eat, and thus when done b’shogeg, it is not considered a transgression of divrei Chachamim. This is the explanation of the Nesivos according to HaGaon Rav Elchanan Wasserman hy”d, in his sefer Kovetz Ha’aros (8:15). He adds that the reason a shogeg needs kaporah is not simply because the person was not careful enough in general, rather, it is specifically because it is an issur cheftza, therefore, he should have been more careful.
Therefore, with issurei derabbanan that are only prohibitions on the gavra, the issue of why they weren’t careful enough doesn’t apply, and therefore no kaporah is needed at all.
According to this, in our case where they transgressed an issur derabbanan b’shogeg, there is no michshol [stumbling block] here at all, and no kaporah is needed. Therefore, the one who caused this did not violate lifnei iveir, because they did not cause their fellow to stumble. This has been established as the halachah in a number of sifrei acharonim.
R' Yaakov Skoczylas shlita adds: Although some argue and take a more stringent approach, one may be lenient, especially considering that this is a matter of kavod habriyos in a case of an issur derabbanan, as it would be a great embarrassment for the Sheva Berachos hosts to have to tell everyone.
