Working With All Ones Strength
Project Likkutei Sichos | November 27, 2025
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Working With All Ones Strength

Project Likkutei Sichos | December 07, 2025

1. THE WORKER’S DUTY
Rambam concludes Hilchos Sechirus {the Laws of Hiring} with this ruling:
Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker, nor to withhold it from him, the poor person is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said:

“I served your father with all my strength.” Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse:

“And the man became prodigiously wealthy.”
The Alter Rebbe states this same law in his Shulchan Aruch:

Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker, nor to delay payment of it, the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work due his employer and tarry slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said: “I served your father with all my strength.” Therefore, he was granted his reward even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.”
At first glance, it seems the Alter Rebbe is simply quoting Rambam (with slight modifications). But a careful reading reveals a significant structural difference in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch:
After presenting Yaakov’s example, the Alter Rebbe adds:
Therefore, a worker may not perform work at night and then hire himself out {to another employer} during the day. Similarly, one may not work with his animal at night and then hire {the animal} out by day. Also, a worker should not starve and afflict himself, because {by doing so} his energy will be sapped and he will not be able to perform his work robustly.

2. ORDER OR PRINCIPLE?

Ostensibly, one may suggest that this change is (not a change in content, but) merely in the order of presentation, in accordance with the difference between Rambam’s work and the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch:
Rambam wrote his work as “halachos halachos {laws upon laws}” — without the reasons for the laws. The Alter Rebbe, by contrast, wrote his Shulchan Aruch specifically as “laws with their reasons.”

Therefore, the Alter Rebbe presents the laws in a manner that reveals the reason and definition of the laws. For this reason, he mentions all these laws in the same se’if {paragraph}, following a general introduction that applies to all of them: “Just as the employer is warned... the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work due his employer”— which is the defining principle of all these laws.
Within this framework, he first presents the warning and obligation “to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength,” and only afterward, the prohibition that results from this, which also relates to when work may be performed — “a worker may not perform work at night...”
Rambam, by contrast, is primarily concerned with presenting the halachic ruling, and therefore he presents the laws according to chronological order: first, the prohibition that applies before the actual time of work (“a worker may not...”), and only afterward the warnings that apply during the work itself — “he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
[Additionally: The laws “a worker may not...” are (apparently) a continuation of Rambam’s earlier discussion of permissible worker “deceit” — “workers are permitted to dip their bread in brine...” — to which he adds: “However, a worker may not....”]
However, this is not a sufficient explanation in our case, because Rambam begins the final halachah with an introduction: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker... the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer” — even though Rambam had already explicitly stated in the previous halachah that there must not be “theft of the employer’s work.” This demonstrates it is not merely an additional ruling based on a change in when or how the prohibition applies, but rather, a separate and independent principle.
In other words: According to the Alter Rebbe, since the laws “a worker may not...” appear immediately following the obligation for a worker “to work with all his strength” ({introduced with the word “therefore” —} “therefore, a worker may not...”), it follows that this is a result of the obligation for a worker to work with all his strength. According to Rambam, however, who states these laws in an earlier halachah, this is a separate law and prohibition in its own right.
The understanding indicated in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch — that the specific laws “a worker may not...” are linked to the obligation “to work with all his strength” (which we derive from Yaakov) — is stated explicitly in Sefer Mitzvos Gadol.

This, however, requires explanation and clarification: What is the rationale behind these two approaches — whether the aforementioned laws are a result of the obligation “to work with all his strength,” or constitute an independent law in their own right?

3. UNDERSTANDING YAAKOV’S EXAMPLE

This will become clear by first explaining the aforementioned example of Yaakov (cited in Rambam): “Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.’”

Several aspects of this passage require clarification:
a) Rambam is (as mentioned) a work of “halachos halachos.” What halachic relevance does the concluding statement — “Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world...” — possess?
It would be difficult to suggest that Rambam writes this merely to conclude (Hilchos Sechirus) on a positive note — because [aside from the fact that Rambam does not conclude all 83 sections of halachos in the Mishneh Torah with something positive; furthermore, and more fundamentally,] this very wording also appears in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch but not at the conclusion of these laws. Moreover, in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, it appears in the middle of a se’if!
b) Furthermore, Rambam would seem, at first glance, to contradict himself. Earlier, he cites Yaakov — “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength’” — as proof that there is an obligation for a worker to work with all his strength. Yet with the words, “Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world...,” he seems to negate (or at least weaken) that very proof, because this implies that it was not an obligation but rather an exceptional level of conduct unique to Yaakov, for which his reward was likewise unique — “he was granted reward for this even in this world.”
c) Why does Rambam use the term “sheharei {for},” rather than the more standard citation terminology “shene’emar {as it says},” “kemo shene’emar {as it is stated},” or the like?
d) Why does Rambam use the title “hatzaddik {the righteous},” a term not typically used by Rambam as a title? If he wanted to add a title, it should have been the standard one, “Yaakov Avinu {our forefather Yaakov}.” This is especially problematic since this title actually weakens the proof by suggesting this was unique behavior of “the righteous Yaakov.”

One might suggest that with all these aforementioned expressions Rambam is addressing the following question: Since we do not derive laws from events that occurred before the Giving of the Torah, how can we derive this law in Hilchos Sechirus from Yaakov’s conduct prior to the Giving of the Torah?
Accordingly, Rambam does not use the language generally employed for a proof, “shene’emar” (and the like), because he is not actually deriving the law from Yaakov’s statement. Rather, it is merely a form of asmachta {scriptural support} (or simply an illustration {gilui milsa}), intended to demonstrate the significance of the matter through Yaakov’s example: “‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world.”
However, this explanation is difficult to accept. We find in many places — including in the Mishneh Torah itself (in the preceding halachos) — that laws are derived from events that occurred prior to the Giving of the Torah. (Indeed, from a {pre-Sinaitic} event recorded in our very parshah, Rambam derives the law that “even during Chol HaMoed one may not marry... because we do not mix one celebration with another,” as he continues, “as it says {shene’emar}: ‘Complete the {bridal-celebration} week of this one, and then we will give you this one too.’”) This does not contradict the principle that laws are not derived from events before the Giving of the Torah, as explained by the various distinctions offered by the commentaries. In our case, this is undoubtedly true, for this is not a technical or specific law, but rather a general standard of worker conduct based on mutual agreement and understanding — which can certainly be derived from events before the Giving of the Torah.

Moreover, concerning this very topic — Yaakov’s work for Lavan — we do derive a principle from Yaakov, as the Gemara states: “To what extent is a paid guardian obligated to safeguard? To the extent that {Yaakov said to Lavan:} ‘This is how I existed: I was consumed by day by scorching heat and at night by frost.’”

4. AN INTERPERSONAL OBLIGATION

We can offer the following explanation:
By citing the proof, “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this...,” Rambam clarifies the nature of the obligation “to work with all his strength.” Earlier, Rambam writes: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker..., the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time....” He then continues: “Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
One might have assumed that the obligation to be precise with his time is linked to the prohibition against “stealing from the work due his employer,” while the obligation “to work with all his strength” is not (as directly) related to the employer’s work (to such an extent that failing to do so would constitute “stealing from the work due his employer”). Rather, it would merely relate to the worker himself and to his personal integrity — requiring him to apply himself to his work with complete dedication. In other words, this obligation would not be seen (primarily) as something “between man and his fellow” — between the worker and the employer — but rather as akin to a matter “between man and G-d.”
It is for this reason that Rambam cites the proof, “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.’” The proof is not (merely) from the beginning of Yaakov’s words, “I served your father with all my strength.”
(On the contrary, one might argue that Yaakov was emphasizing that he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, a level of service to which he was not obligated, and that this therefore would prove the opposite — that not every worker is obligated to work with all his strength.)
The (decisive) proof comes from the continuation: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this... (in the form of) ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy....’” The significance here is (not so much that Yaakov received reward from Hashem for fulfilling a Divine command — while for other mitzvos the reward might be only in the World to Come, this merited reward in this world as well — but rather) that he received “reward for this” — meaning the reward for his actual labor. That is, the wage that Lavan agreed upon with him ultimately resulted in the fact that — despite Lavan’s attempts to deceive him — because “I served with all my strength,” “the man became prodigiously wealthy,” meaning his compensation matched the manner in which he worked.
Thus, it becomes clear that “working with all his strength” relates not only to the worker as an individual, but also directly to his labor for the employer. For this reason, Yaakov received reward for it even in this world.

5. YAAKOV AS STANDARD, NOT EXCEPTION

Based on this, the two aforementioned textual difficulties in Rambam’s language can be resolved:
a) Why does he say “sheharei {for}” rather than “shene’emar {as it says}”? Because the proof does not come (merely) from the verse “I served your father with all my strength,” but (also and) primarily from the subsequent continuation: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this....”
b) Why does he say “Yaakov HaTzaddik {the righteous Yaakov}” rather than “Yaakov Avinu {our forefather Yaakov}”?
The explanation is as follows:
From Rambam’s statements at the beginning of Hilchos Deios, it is clear that the title “tzaddik” (as Rambam uses it throughout Mishneh Torah) does not refer to someone who performs mitzvos in an enhanced manner {hiddur mitzvah} and the like, but rather to one who conducts himself according to the law and its obligations. This is apparent from the verses he cites there regarding character traits and personal conduct, which demonstrate that whoever follows “the straight path, which is the intermediate path,” is termed (in Scripture) “tzaddik {righteous}” (whereas one who “is particularly scrupulous” and acts “beyond the letter of the law” is called a “chassid {pious}”).
This is Rambam’s point — Yaakov’s practice of working with all his strength was not a matter of pious behavior, etc. (a unique standard befitting one of the three forefathers — Yaakov our forefather). Rather, this represents the obligatory standard for workers — every worker — in performing the employer’s work.

6. ESSENTIAL VS. ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION

This novel insight — that the obligation to work with all one’s strength is connected (not merely to the worker’s general integrity, but) to the work he performs for the employer — can be explained in two ways:
One approach maintains that this obligation is indeed related to the work itself, but as an additional element beyond the basic work requirement. It represents a separate worker obligation toward the employer.
This is Rambam’s position, as reflected in his division of the laws concerning theft of the employer’s work into two distinct halachos. In the first halachah, he states that “a worker may not perform his work at night... because this constitutes theft of the employer’s work, for his strength will be depleted... and he will not perform the work with strength.” In the next halachah, he continues: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker... the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit.... Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
According to Rambam, two obligations exist: (1) the requirement to perform the work with strength, and (2) a separate requirement — “to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.” The distinction between them may be explained as follows:
Performing work with strength is intrinsic to the nature of work itself; when work is not performed with strength, the very definition of work is absent. By contrast, the obligation “to work with all one’s strength” does not stem from the definition of the work itself, but rather arises from the specific commitment the worker undertakes toward his particular employer.
Put differently: “work with strength” is connected to the object — the work itself — while “work with all one’s strength” relates to the person — to the relationship between the worker and the employer, within which the worker’s very self is acquired by the employer.

According to the Alter Rebbe, however, these are not two separate laws — ordinary work and work with all one’s strength — but a single law. “Work with strength” and “work with all one’s strength” are not distinct classifications (a general classification of labor and an additional classification, arising from the worker’s specific commitment (and acquisition) to his particular employer). Rather, they form one unified obligation — all connected to the employer’s work.
Therefore, the Alter Rebbe presents the laws “a worker may not...” as a direct continuation of the introduction: “Just as the employer is warned... the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work owed to his employer... He is obligated to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength... (Therefore, a worker is not permitted...).”

7. TEXTUAL VARIATIONS REFLECTING CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

Based on the above, we can now understand several {seemingly} minor variations between the Alter Rebbe’s language and Rambam’s. Although these differences appear slight, given the well-known precision of the Alter Rebbe’s “golden language” — and particularly considering that he deviates from Rambam’s wording here — it is clear that these changes also reflect substantive differences:
a) At the end of the first halachah, Rambam explains the rationale behind the laws “a worker may not perform his work at night... nor starve or afflict himself....” He writes: “because of theft of the employer’s work, for his strength will be depleted and his mind weakened, and he will not perform the work with strength.” The Alter Rebbe, however, modifies three details:

  • He omits “because of theft of the employer’s work.”
  • He replaces “and he will not perform” with “and he will not be able to perform.”
  • He substitutes “the work” with “the employer’s work.”

In light of the above analysis, this is readily understood. According to Rambam, the deficiency is that “he will not perform the work with strength” — that is, the labor itself loses its very definition as valid work. Therefore, merely placing oneself in a condition where such a deficiency will arise constitutes “theft of the employer’s work,” for he becomes effectively unfit to be a worker, and thus his output no longer qualifies as true work.
According to the Alter Rebbe, however, the deficiency concerns his inability to “perform the employer’s work with strength” — relating to his specific commitment (and acquisition) to the employer. Consequently, the prohibition against “performing work at night, etc.” does not itself constitute theft of the employer’s work per se. Rather, it is merely a cause: it prevents him from “be{ing} able to perform the employer’s work with strength,” such that when he subsequently performs “the employer’s work,” he will be unable to perform it properly.
b) When citing the proof from Yaakov, Rambam writes: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this,” whereas the Alter Rebbe writes simply: “Therefore, he was granted his reward.”

1. THE WORKER’S DUTY
Rambam concludes Hilchos Sechirus {the Laws of Hiring} with this ruling:
Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker, nor to withhold it from him, the poor person is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said:

“I served your father with all my strength.” Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse:

“And the man became prodigiously wealthy.”
The Alter Rebbe states this same law in his Shulchan Aruch:

Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker, nor to delay payment of it, the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work due his employer and tarry slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said: “I served your father with all my strength.” Therefore, he was granted his reward even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.”
At first glance, it seems the Alter Rebbe is simply quoting Rambam (with slight modifications). But a careful reading reveals a significant structural difference in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch:
After presenting Yaakov’s example, the Alter Rebbe adds:
Therefore, a worker may not perform work at night and then hire himself out {to another employer} during the day. Similarly, one may not work with his animal at night and then hire {the animal} out by day. Also, a worker should not starve and afflict himself, because {by doing so} his energy will be sapped and he will not be able to perform his work robustly.

2. ORDER OR PRINCIPLE?

Ostensibly, one may suggest that this change is (not a change in content, but) merely in the order of presentation, in accordance with the difference between Rambam’s work and the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch:
Rambam wrote his work as “halachos halachos {laws upon laws}” — without the reasons for the laws. The Alter Rebbe, by contrast, wrote his Shulchan Aruch specifically as “laws with their reasons.”

Therefore, the Alter Rebbe presents the laws in a manner that reveals the reason and definition of the laws. For this reason, he mentions all these laws in the same se’if {paragraph}, following a general introduction that applies to all of them: “Just as the employer is warned... the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work due his employer”— which is the defining principle of all these laws.
Within this framework, he first presents the warning and obligation “to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength,” and only afterward, the prohibition that results from this, which also relates to when work may be performed — “a worker may not perform work at night...”
Rambam, by contrast, is primarily concerned with presenting the halachic ruling, and therefore he presents the laws according to chronological order: first, the prohibition that applies before the actual time of work (“a worker may not...”), and only afterward the warnings that apply during the work itself — “he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time.... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
[Additionally: The laws “a worker may not...” are (apparently) a continuation of Rambam’s earlier discussion of permissible worker “deceit” — “workers are permitted to dip their bread in brine...” — to which he adds: “However, a worker may not....”]
However, this is not a sufficient explanation in our case, because Rambam begins the final halachah with an introduction: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker... the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer” — even though Rambam had already explicitly stated in the previous halachah that there must not be “theft of the employer’s work.” This demonstrates it is not merely an additional ruling based on a change in when or how the prohibition applies, but rather, a separate and independent principle.
In other words: According to the Alter Rebbe, since the laws “a worker may not...” appear immediately following the obligation for a worker “to work with all his strength” ({introduced with the word “therefore” —} “therefore, a worker may not...”), it follows that this is a result of the obligation for a worker to work with all his strength. According to Rambam, however, who states these laws in an earlier halachah, this is a separate law and prohibition in its own right.
The understanding indicated in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch — that the specific laws “a worker may not...” are linked to the obligation “to work with all his strength” (which we derive from Yaakov) — is stated explicitly in Sefer Mitzvos Gadol.

This, however, requires explanation and clarification: What is the rationale behind these two approaches — whether the aforementioned laws are a result of the obligation “to work with all his strength,” or constitute an independent law in their own right?

3. UNDERSTANDING YAAKOV’S EXAMPLE

This will become clear by first explaining the aforementioned example of Yaakov (cited in Rambam): “Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength, for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.’”

Several aspects of this passage require clarification:
a) Rambam is (as mentioned) a work of “halachos halachos.” What halachic relevance does the concluding statement — “Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world...” — possess?
It would be difficult to suggest that Rambam writes this merely to conclude (Hilchos Sechirus) on a positive note — because [aside from the fact that Rambam does not conclude all 83 sections of halachos in the Mishneh Torah with something positive; furthermore, and more fundamentally,] this very wording also appears in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch but not at the conclusion of these laws. Moreover, in the Alter Rebbe’s Shulchan Aruch, it appears in the middle of a se’if!
b) Furthermore, Rambam would seem, at first glance, to contradict himself. Earlier, he cites Yaakov — “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength’” — as proof that there is an obligation for a worker to work with all his strength. Yet with the words, “Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world...,” he seems to negate (or at least weaken) that very proof, because this implies that it was not an obligation but rather an exceptional level of conduct unique to Yaakov, for which his reward was likewise unique — “he was granted reward for this even in this world.”
c) Why does Rambam use the term “sheharei {for},” rather than the more standard citation terminology “shene’emar {as it says},” “kemo shene’emar {as it is stated},” or the like?
d) Why does Rambam use the title “hatzaddik {the righteous},” a term not typically used by Rambam as a title? If he wanted to add a title, it should have been the standard one, “Yaakov Avinu {our forefather Yaakov}.” This is especially problematic since this title actually weakens the proof by suggesting this was unique behavior of “the righteous Yaakov.”

One might suggest that with all these aforementioned expressions Rambam is addressing the following question: Since we do not derive laws from events that occurred before the Giving of the Torah, how can we derive this law in Hilchos Sechirus from Yaakov’s conduct prior to the Giving of the Torah?
Accordingly, Rambam does not use the language generally employed for a proof, “shene’emar” (and the like), because he is not actually deriving the law from Yaakov’s statement. Rather, it is merely a form of asmachta {scriptural support} (or simply an illustration {gilui milsa}), intended to demonstrate the significance of the matter through Yaakov’s example: “‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world.”
However, this explanation is difficult to accept. We find in many places — including in the Mishneh Torah itself (in the preceding halachos) — that laws are derived from events that occurred prior to the Giving of the Torah. (Indeed, from a {pre-Sinaitic} event recorded in our very parshah, Rambam derives the law that “even during Chol HaMoed one may not marry... because we do not mix one celebration with another,” as he continues, “as it says {shene’emar}: ‘Complete the {bridal-celebration} week of this one, and then we will give you this one too.’”) This does not contradict the principle that laws are not derived from events before the Giving of the Torah, as explained by the various distinctions offered by the commentaries. In our case, this is undoubtedly true, for this is not a technical or specific law, but rather a general standard of worker conduct based on mutual agreement and understanding — which can certainly be derived from events before the Giving of the Torah.

Moreover, concerning this very topic — Yaakov’s work for Lavan — we do derive a principle from Yaakov, as the Gemara states: “To what extent is a paid guardian obligated to safeguard? To the extent that {Yaakov said to Lavan:} ‘This is how I existed: I was consumed by day by scorching heat and at night by frost.’”

4. AN INTERPERSONAL OBLIGATION

We can offer the following explanation:
By citing the proof, “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this...,” Rambam clarifies the nature of the obligation “to work with all his strength.” Earlier, Rambam writes: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker..., the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit. Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time....” He then continues: “Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
One might have assumed that the obligation to be precise with his time is linked to the prohibition against “stealing from the work due his employer,” while the obligation “to work with all his strength” is not (as directly) related to the employer’s work (to such an extent that failing to do so would constitute “stealing from the work due his employer”). Rather, it would merely relate to the worker himself and to his personal integrity — requiring him to apply himself to his work with complete dedication. In other words, this obligation would not be seen (primarily) as something “between man and his fellow” — between the worker and the employer — but rather as akin to a matter “between man and G-d.”
It is for this reason that Rambam cites the proof, “for the righteous Yaakov said: ‘I served your father with all my strength.’ Therefore, he was granted reward for this even in this world, as indicated by the verse: ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy.’” The proof is not (merely) from the beginning of Yaakov’s words, “I served your father with all my strength.”
(On the contrary, one might argue that Yaakov was emphasizing that he conducted himself beyond the letter of the law, a level of service to which he was not obligated, and that this therefore would prove the opposite — that not every worker is obligated to work with all his strength.)
The (decisive) proof comes from the continuation: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this... (in the form of) ‘And the man became prodigiously wealthy....’” The significance here is (not so much that Yaakov received reward from Hashem for fulfilling a Divine command — while for other mitzvos the reward might be only in the World to Come, this merited reward in this world as well — but rather) that he received “reward for this” — meaning the reward for his actual labor. That is, the wage that Lavan agreed upon with him ultimately resulted in the fact that — despite Lavan’s attempts to deceive him — because “I served with all my strength,” “the man became prodigiously wealthy,” meaning his compensation matched the manner in which he worked.
Thus, it becomes clear that “working with all his strength” relates not only to the worker as an individual, but also directly to his labor for the employer. For this reason, Yaakov received reward for it even in this world.

5. YAAKOV AS STANDARD, NOT EXCEPTION

Based on this, the two aforementioned textual difficulties in Rambam’s language can be resolved:
a) Why does he say “sheharei {for}” rather than “shene’emar {as it says}”? Because the proof does not come (merely) from the verse “I served your father with all my strength,” but (also and) primarily from the subsequent continuation: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this....”
b) Why does he say “Yaakov HaTzaddik {the righteous Yaakov}” rather than “Yaakov Avinu {our forefather Yaakov}”?
The explanation is as follows:
From Rambam’s statements at the beginning of Hilchos Deios, it is clear that the title “tzaddik” (as Rambam uses it throughout Mishneh Torah) does not refer to someone who performs mitzvos in an enhanced manner {hiddur mitzvah} and the like, but rather to one who conducts himself according to the law and its obligations. This is apparent from the verses he cites there regarding character traits and personal conduct, which demonstrate that whoever follows “the straight path, which is the intermediate path,” is termed (in Scripture) “tzaddik {righteous}” (whereas one who “is particularly scrupulous” and acts “beyond the letter of the law” is called a “chassid {pious}”).
This is Rambam’s point — Yaakov’s practice of working with all his strength was not a matter of pious behavior, etc. (a unique standard befitting one of the three forefathers — Yaakov our forefather). Rather, this represents the obligatory standard for workers — every worker — in performing the employer’s work.

6. ESSENTIAL VS. ADDITIONAL OBLIGATION

This novel insight — that the obligation to work with all one’s strength is connected (not merely to the worker’s general integrity, but) to the work he performs for the employer — can be explained in two ways:
One approach maintains that this obligation is indeed related to the work itself, but as an additional element beyond the basic work requirement. It represents a separate worker obligation toward the employer.
This is Rambam’s position, as reflected in his division of the laws concerning theft of the employer’s work into two distinct halachos. In the first halachah, he states that “a worker may not perform his work at night... because this constitutes theft of the employer’s work, for his strength will be depleted... and he will not perform the work with strength.” In the next halachah, he continues: “Just as the employer is warned not to steal the wage of his poor worker... the poor worker is similarly warned not to steal from the work due his employer and neglect his work slightly here and there, {thus} spending the entire day in deceit.... Instead, he is obligated to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.”
According to Rambam, two obligations exist: (1) the requirement to perform the work with strength, and (2) a separate requirement — “to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength.” The distinction between them may be explained as follows:
Performing work with strength is intrinsic to the nature of work itself; when work is not performed with strength, the very definition of work is absent. By contrast, the obligation “to work with all one’s strength” does not stem from the definition of the work itself, but rather arises from the specific commitment the worker undertakes toward his particular employer.
Put differently: “work with strength” is connected to the object — the work itself — while “work with all one’s strength” relates to the person — to the relationship between the worker and the employer, within which the worker’s very self is acquired by the employer.

According to the Alter Rebbe, however, these are not two separate laws — ordinary work and work with all one’s strength — but a single law. “Work with strength” and “work with all one’s strength” are not distinct classifications (a general classification of labor and an additional classification, arising from the worker’s specific commitment (and acquisition) to his particular employer). Rather, they form one unified obligation — all connected to the employer’s work.
Therefore, the Alter Rebbe presents the laws “a worker may not...” as a direct continuation of the introduction: “Just as the employer is warned... the poor worker is similarly warned not to neglect the work owed to his employer... He is obligated to be precise with regard to his time... Similarly, a worker is obligated to work with all his strength... (Therefore, a worker is not permitted...).”

7. TEXTUAL VARIATIONS REFLECTING CONCEPTUAL DIFFERENCES

Based on the above, we can now understand several {seemingly} minor variations between the Alter Rebbe’s language and Rambam’s. Although these differences appear slight, given the well-known precision of the Alter Rebbe’s “golden language” — and particularly considering that he deviates from Rambam’s wording here — it is clear that these changes also reflect substantive differences:
a) At the end of the first halachah, Rambam explains the rationale behind the laws “a worker may not perform his work at night... nor starve or afflict himself....” He writes: “because of theft of the employer’s work, for his strength will be depleted and his mind weakened, and he will not perform the work with strength.” The Alter Rebbe, however, modifies three details:

  • He omits “because of theft of the employer’s work.”
  • He replaces “and he will not perform” with “and he will not be able to perform.”
  • He substitutes “the work” with “the employer’s work.”

In light of the above analysis, this is readily understood. According to Rambam, the deficiency is that “he will not perform the work with strength” — that is, the labor itself loses its very definition as valid work. Therefore, merely placing oneself in a condition where such a deficiency will arise constitutes “theft of the employer’s work,” for he becomes effectively unfit to be a worker, and thus his output no longer qualifies as true work.
According to the Alter Rebbe, however, the deficiency concerns his inability to “perform the employer’s work with strength” — relating to his specific commitment (and acquisition) to the employer. Consequently, the prohibition against “performing work at night, etc.” does not itself constitute theft of the employer’s work per se. Rather, it is merely a cause: it prevents him from “be{ing} able to perform the employer’s work with strength,” such that when he subsequently performs “the employer’s work,” he will be unable to perform it properly.
b) When citing the proof from Yaakov, Rambam writes: “Therefore, he was granted reward for this,” whereas the Alter Rebbe writes simply: “Therefore, he was granted his reward.”

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Project Likkutei Sichos | November 27, 2025