The ransom demanded by terror organizations today, as the State of Israel knows well, is not financial but rather human. The demand to free terrorists from Israeli prisons introduces a new, hitherto unexplored element into the question of redeeming captives. Is it permitted to free dangerous prisoners, who, very recent experience shows, are likely to return to their murderous practices, for the sake of releasing Jewish captives?
One possible approach to this question is to view it as entering a state of potential danger for the sake of alleviating an immediate danger to a captive’s life. Poskim dispute the question of saving somebody’s life at the expense of placing oneself in a state of potential danger. Some authorities (Hagaos Maimonis, Hilchos Rotzeach 1:15) maintain that one is obligated to do so, while others (Sema, 426) state that one is not obligated in this. Indeed, the Radvaz (3:627) goes so far as to label such a rescue as an act of folly.
Freeing terrorists seems to fit the category of exchanging a definite danger for a potential danger, which would invoke the dispute of poskim mentioned above.
The Gilyon Maharsha (Yoreh De’ah 157) issues an explicit ruling on a similar question, stating that “if somebody is taken captive, and it is known that if he is redeemed, another will be taken in his stead, it is forbidden to redeem him... however, if there is a doubt whether the other will be taken captive, we do not abandon the definite captive because of the doubt.” In other words, we should not refrain from redeeming somebody in certain danger because of a potential danger in the future. However, it can be argued that one may not exchange a present danger to one person for a great danger to a very large group, which the release of an arch-terrorist could bring about.
The ruling whereby a possible danger for the future does not defer a certain danger at the present is also given by Rabbi Ovadia Yosef (Yabia Omer, 10:6)—the Teshuvah relates to the Entebbe raid of 1976, and touches directly on the question of releasing terrorists in exchange for a captive’s freedom.
R’ Ovadia cites as proof a Teshuvah from the Noda B’Yehudah. The Noda B’Yehudah says that carrying out autopsies on Jewish bodies are forbidden, even though they may help save other Jewish lives somewhere later on down the line, since at this moment in time they don’t they are forbidden. The Noda B’Yehudah says, however, that if it will help save another Jewish life now, then we do. R’ Ovadia extrapolates from here, that when it comes to pikuach nefesh we look at the present, not the future. Therefore, the same thing is with freeing captives, even if releasing terrorists may present a danger, since at this moment in time it doesn’t, we aren’t concerned about it.
