Answers to this Week’s Riddles
(For the riddles, please see back page)
1) In this week's parsha we have the pasuk: שום תשים עליך מלך – “You shall place upon yourself a king" (17:15).
The Sifri darshens: מלך ולא מלכה – "A king and not a queen” i.e. that only a man can be appointed as a monarch and not a woman.
The Rambam (Hilchos Melachim 1:5) rules accordingly: אין מעמידין אשה במלכות שנאמר שום תשים עליך מלך ולא מלכה – “We do not appoint a woman as a monarch, as the Torah states: ‘You shall place upon yourself a king' - meaning, a king and not a queen."
However, the Rambam adds a chiddush: וכן בל משימות שבישראל אין ממנים בהם אלא איש – "the same applies for any position of authority in Klal Yisrael, we only appoint men.”
R' Moshe (Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2, siman 44) writes about this Rambam that he is unawre of the source. The Sifri mentioned that a woman shouldn't be appointed as a king, however, he never mentioned that a woman can't have other positions. He concludes it must be the Rambam said it based on his own reasoning.
In light of the above Rambam, R' Moshe says that a woman is forbidden to be a mashgiach kashrus as it is a position of authority. However, in the case of a widow who has no other source of income one may be lenient, as a number of Rishonim dispute the Rambam's extension of the prohibition and maintain that it is limited specifically to monarchy, and does not apply to other positions of authority.
2) In this week's parsha the Torah tells us (Devarim 17:16): לא תספון לשוב בדרך הזה עוד - "You shall not return that way again." This is understood as a prohibition against returning to Mitzrayim.
Many ask: How could the Rambam — and other great gedolim — live in Mitzrayim if the Torah forbids it?
The Kaftor VaFerach reports that he heard in Mitzrayim from HaRav Shmuel one of the descendants of the Rambam that when the Rambam lived in Mitzrayim he would sign off his letters with the words: “Moshe ben Maimon, who transgresses three prohibitions every day by living in Mitzrayim."
However, the Achronim strongly reject this story. They argue: That the Rambam was extremely careful to fulfill everything he wrote; it is impossible he would sign such a statement. Rav Yisrael Av Beis Din of Mitzrayim (in his sefer Even Sapir 37a; Yishrei Lev, Yoreh Deah 17a and Shvilei HaDaʼas Vol. 2, pg. 89a) writes that this rumor was invented by the Rambam's opponents.
Many answers have been given to explain why the Rambam was allowed to live in Mitzrayim:
i) The prohibition applies only if one returns to Mitzrayim using the same route that was used when we left during Yetzias Mitzrayim. This is implicit in the pasuk which says: לא תספון לשוב בדרך הזה עוד - "Do not return using this route again." The Rambam and other gedolim that returned to Mitzrayim used a different route, therefore, there was no issur. (Ritva Yoma 38b; Ra'em on the Parsha; and Mordechai end of Perek He'orel)
Additional support: The Divrei Shaul (Ba'al Sho'el U’Meishiv, Mahadura Kama beginning of Maʼasei) notes that this explains why Parshas Maʼasei lists all the 42 journeys of Klal Yisrael. The Torah lists all the journeys so we can determine which route Klal Yisrael took when leaving Mitzrayim, and therefore be careful not to return to Mitzrayim via the same route.
ii) The prohibition is only when the Jewish people are settled in Eretz Yisrael. However, nowadays, since we are scattered throughout the foreign lands, the entire Chutz Laʼaretz is considered one and returning to Mitzrayim is no different from living anywhere else in Chutz Laʼaretz. (Ritva Yoma 38b)
iii) The Sifrei in this week's parsha teaches that going to Mitzrayim for commerce is allowed.
The Radvaz on the Rambam explains: The Rambam and other gedolim who returned to Mitzrayim did not intend permanent residence; their purpose was livelihood. Therefore, no prohibition was violated. (see also Shu”t Hisorarus Teshuvah, Yoreh Deah siman 182)
iv) Sancheriv exiled and mixed the nations of the world, so the people living in Mitzrayim today are not the people who originally used to live there, therefore, the prohibition no longer applies. (Ritva and Ra'em)
Some argue: The prohibition is about the place, not the people. If so, mixing nations wouldn't make a difference. (Birchas Aharon on Berachos, Maʼamer 229 and Shu"t Shoel U'Meishiv, Tinyona, 4:107)
Others respond: The prohibition to return to the place of Mitzrayim was because of the people — to prevent Klal Yisrael from learning their ways. Once those people disappeared, the reason for the prohibition also disappeared. (See Shu”t Chaim She'al siman 91 and Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah 503)
v) The Radvaz (Hilchos Melachim 5:7) writes:
The Rambam was forced to live there as he was a physician for the king and his ministers.
The Radvaz adds: I myself lived there for a long time and taught Torah and established a Yeshivah there.
vi) The Chida writes in Shem HaGedolim under the entry for the Rambam: Come and see the greatness of the Rambam's deeds. When the Rambam first arrived in Mitzrayim, the Jewish community there was exceedingly small compared to the Karaites, to the point that almost the entire community was drawn after Karaite practices, and the mitzvah of mikveh was nearly abolished among them. Seeing this situation, the Rambam uprooted his residence and settled in Mitzrayim, where he succeeded in returning the entire Jewish community to the path of the Torah of Moshe Rabbeinu.
According to this, the reason the Rambam went to Mitzrayim was in order to bring the majority of the Jewish people there back to proper observance — and there is no greater mitzvah than this. Therefore, the Rambam was permitted to reside there.
3) The story was as follows: A Yid living in a certain moshav brought five sheep to Rav Elyashiv zt"l so he could fulfill the mitzvah of reishis hageiz. Rav Elyashiv bought the sheep, gave the wool to a Kohen, and was very happy to fulfill the mitzvah.
Afterwards, the seller asked to buy the sheep back, however, Rav Elyashiv refused and said they must be slaughtered immediately, because it is forbidden to raise small livestock in Eretz Yisrael, as stated in Demai (2:3) and Bava Kama (79b).
After a lengthy discussion between Rav Elyashiv and the seller from the moshav, the sheep were nevertheless sold back to the seller. However, amazingly the seller later reported that within a week all five sheep died (Recorded in Chashukei Chemed on Zeraim, pg. 274.)
4) The Gemara in Bava Kama (17b) teaches: זרק בלי מראש הגג ובא אחר ושברו חייב – "If one throws his utensil off a roof and someone comes along and smashes it before it lands, the one who smashed it must pay.” The Nesivos (261, end of s.k. 1) explains that this is not a case of aveidah miʼdaas havei hefker — that the owner's act shows he no longer wants the item and it therefore becomes ownerless. The reason is that we are dealing with a situation in which the owner threw the utensil off the roof in a place where people were obligated to save it.
The Nesivos writes that the obligation to save it stems from the prohibition of ba'al tashchis. Since others are obligated to prevent its destruction, the owner never relinquished ownership. We therefore see that in this case, even though the people walking by are merely shev v'al ta'aseh, there is still an obligation of ba'al tashchis.
This raises a question: Why are the passersby obligated to save the utensil? We stated earlier that baʼal tashchis does not apply when the waste occurs through shev v'al ta'aseh.
The Achronim [Mishpat Aveidah (end of the sefer, siman 17 d.h. acher), Birur Halachah (siman 261 s.k. 1), and Eitz HaSadeh (siman 7, he’orah 36)] explain that although the owner wishes to violate ba'al tashchis, if the utensil ultimately does not break, he will be spared from transgressing an aveirah. As a result, a passerby who is able to save the utensil is obligated to do so based on the principle of arvus — that every Jew must be concerned for another Jew's mitzvos and aveiros.
However, if a person sees his friend's item being lost on its own, without the owner actively causing its destruction, then there is no violation of baʼal tashchis, since it is shev v’al taʼaseh. In such a case, the passerby has no obligation to intervene.
5) R' Elyashiv ruled that in such a case, if one cannot easily find someone willing to eat it, the food may be discarded, and there is no requirement to wait until it becomes moldy.
Similarly, both R' Elyashiv and the Shevet HaLevi ruled that if a food is infested and checking it thoroughly to remove all insects would require significant effort, or if one is repulsed by the food, it may be thrown out without concern for ba'al tashchis. (See Bedikas HaMazon K’Halachah, Vol. 1)
6) The Medrash Rabbah (Toldos 65:12) teaches: “Seven things are hidden from humans: the day of death, the day of consolation, the depth of judgment... and no person knows what is in a woman's pregnancy."
The Yafeh To'ar explains: If parents knew the fetus's gender, they would worry throughout pregnancy if it were not what they desired. And if they knew in advance that she was carrying a male which they wanted the joy at birth would be diminished, and she would not receive reward for the pains of childbirth. And additional reasons can be found why Hashem concealed these matters.
However, in Pesachim (54b), Chazal list seven hidden things but omit this item.
Does the fact that doctors claim they can determine the fetus's gender nowadays contradict the above Medrash?
R' Yitzchak Zilberstein in his sefer Toras HaYoledes (Perek 60 he'orah 2), quotes a Shu't Chasam Sofer (Even HaEzer 2:82), who distinguishes between “pregnant woman" (meʼuberes) — meaning after three months — and "woman” (isha) — meaning within the first three months.
According to this the Medrash is very precise and still valid as the Medrasah says: אדם יודע מה בעיבורה של אשה – “and no person knows what is in a woman's pregnancy” which refers to the first three months, and even today doctors are only able to determine the gender of the fetus after three months.
Is Checking the Fetus's Gender a Lack of Bitachon?
In Shu't Mishneh Halachos (15:118) R' Menashe Klein was asked whether checking the fetus's gender shows a deficiency in trust in Hashem, especially since the Medrash says Hashem wished it to remain hidden.
He writes that one strive to fulfill the mitzvah in this week's parsha of: תמים תהיה עם ה' אלוקיך - "Be wholehearted with Hashem your G-d,” and not pursue future predictions. He brings several reasons why one should not investigate the matter.
Practically please ask your own shailah about what to do.