Although the evil associated with a prohibition can be appreciated more readily than the evil associated with impurity, there is a more severe dimension associated with impurity. For since the evil associated with impurity is not easily discerned, one will not eradicate it through teshuvah as quickly as one would correct error involving those matters specifically forbidden by the Torah.
Moreover, as reflected by the fact that ritual impurity is a quality which cannot by grasped by mortal intellect, it mars the levels of soul that transcend reason and understanding.
In this context, it is explained that with regard to the relationship between the Jews and G-d, the evil generated through sin — and on a more general level, the Sin of the Golden Calf, which parallels the Sin of the Tree of Knowledge — is comparable to a prohibition and not to a matter of impurity, i.e., it affects our conscious powers, and not the essential powers of the soul. The essence of the soul remains vigorously united with G-d.
Two Supports
Support for the notion that the ban on sexual relations during the niddah state involves a prohibition and is not a result of impurity can be drawn from the following:
a) With regard to the laws of niddah, we employ the principle: “In a case of doubt, the more lenient view is followed.” Tosafos notes that with regard to questions of impurity in a private domain, we find that even when several doubtful factors are involved, the more stringent ruling is followed. Why then is the more lenient ruling followed with regard to questions regarding the niddah state?
Tosafos answers that the leniency is granted only with regard to relations between a woman and her husband. This indicates that the laws governing those relations are matters involving prohibitions and not impurity.
b) On the verse: “And she shall count seven days,” our Sages comment: “by herself;” she alone is responsible. From this, our Rabbis derive the concept that the statements of one witness are accepted with regard to the Torah’s prohibitions.
This supports the argument that the prohibition against sexual relations with a niddah involves a prohibition, not impurity. For laws regarding impurity cannot be derived from laws regarding prohibitions. This applies even when the statement of one witness would be accepted with regard to matters of impurity.
The Analogue in Our Relationship With G-d
Every particular regarding a Torah concept is precise, and the laws that apply in the realm of Nigleh, the revealed dimension of Torah law, have parallels in P’nimiyus HaTorah, the Torah’s mystic teachings. This also applies with regard to the fact that the niddah state is considered to involve a prohibition and not a matter of ritual impurity.
The Jews are described as “one nation on the earth.” This implies that even as they are involved with matters of this earth, they remain within G-d’s domain, where His oneness is expressed. As mentioned above, even while sinning, a Jew’s soul remains faithful to Him.
Because a Jew’s soul is close to G-d, one might think that even when there is a question of evil, one should be judged impure. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the spiritual parallel to the niddah state, a Jew’s distance from G-d, is not a matter of impurity, but can be likened to a prohibition, i.e., the lack and the distance from G-d involves only one’s conscious powers, intellect and emotion. As our Sages say: “A person will not commit a sin unless he is possessed by a spirit of folly.” At that time, he neither understands nor feels G-d’s greatness.
Admittedly, the evil connected with a prohibition does temporarily interrupt a Jew’s connection with G-d. But when there is only a question as to whether a prohibition has been violated, this does not interfere with the connection between the Jews and G-d.
With regard to the second support cited above: The difference between one witness and two witnesses can be explained as follows. The significance of the testimony of two witnesses depends on a court, for it is the power of a court which gives weight to their testimony. For that reason, as long as witnesses do not make their statements in the presence of a court, they can retract them.
The acceptance of the statement of one witness, by contrast, depends on his chezkas kashrus, the assumption that he is an acceptable witness. This is a reflection of the influence of his G-dly soul. Why is he believed? Because every Jew has a chezkas kashrus.
With regard to the chezkas kashrus, the acceptability of the woman (the Jewish people) to her husband (G-d), there is no need to take the matter to court, neither an earthly court nor a heavenly court. One can rely on the Jews’ G-dly souls.
When a Jew heaves a genuine sigh because of his undesirable conduct, he does not need a court to clear him of culpability. And then, as is required of a husband, G-d provides him with sustenance and clothing, and unites with him, as it is said: “Israel and the Holy One, blessed be He, are all one.”
(Adapted from Sichos Yud-Tes Kislev, 5715)
