Yankel made reservations on a glatt-kosher cruise, and he was looking forward to taking a wonderful vacation with his wife. Then, just days before they were scheduled to set out on their trip, a mysterious fire broke out at his home, and despite their best efforts, the firemen were not able to discover the source for the blaze. Fortunately, the home did not suffer any severe damage. In fact, the only real loss was the contents of a single drawer, which ‘happened’ to contain the envelope with the money set aside to pay for the entire trip.
Yankel began to have misgivings. A freak accident that only affected this one drawer? It appeared to him that this was a clear message, a sign from Above that he should not embark on this cruise. However, Yankel had some vague recollection of an issur to make decisions based on omens.
What should Yankel do? May he act on his instincts and forego the trip, or is this indeed forbidden?
To answer this question, we need to examine the various opinions among the meforshim on the topic of following omens. Let us first learn the source of this prohibition in the Torah, and several incidents mentioned in the Chumash and in the Gemara that seem to involve such decisions. We will then return to Yankel and his dilemma.
The Torah states, “lo si’nach’ashu.” Rashi, citing a Gemara, explains that this pasuk prohibits interpreting various mishaps as bad omens. For example, if bread falls out of one’s mouth, or if a deer blocks one’s path, he should not interpret these events as foreshadowing impending troubles and therefore abstain from any planned activities. Rather, he should trust in Hashem and disregard these occurrences.
However, the Gemara gives an important limitation to this halacha. Rav states: “Any act of nichush that does not resemble the nichush of Eliezer, servant of Avrohom, is not forbidden.” This refers to the time Eliezer went to find a wife for Yitzchok, and he created a sign for himself. Since Rivka did exactly as he specified – she offered to draw water for him and his camels – he interpreted this as an omen that she was indeed the maiden he sought.
We must understand two important points here. Firstly, what exactly constitutes Divination? What type of action is comparable to Eliezer’s, and therefore included in this prohibition, and what is different enough to be excluded? Second, it is clearly implied from this Gemara that Eliezer engaged in bona-fide nichush. Are we to understand that Eliezer indeed transgressed this prohibition? The Rishonim offer several approaches to resolve this difficulty.
Tosfos points out that there is a disagreement in the Gemara whether this prohibition applies to non-Jews. Since Eliezer had the status of a nochri, a non-Jew, he might be excluded from this prohibition. And even according to the more stringent opinion that extends this prohibition to non-Jews, as well, Tosfos suggests that Eliezer did not fully rely on the outcome of this omen. He only accepted Rivka as the intended bride for Yitzchak and gave her the jewelry after he ascertained her lineage.
The Rambam seems to accept that Eliezer practiced bona-fide nichush. However, the Ra’avad argues strongly, stating that his act was completely permitted. He seems to follow the opinion of Radak, who explains a crucial difference between Eliezer’s act and true nichush. An act that is not connected in any way to its prediction is nichush. For example, if a person refrains from some action merely because a certain animal crossed his path, he is clearly relying solely on the mystical aspect of the omen to make his decision. By contrast, Eliezer made himself a sign related to his decision. A positive sign would portend a favorable outcome and strengthen his resolve, while a negative sign would be cause for concern and a reason to daven to Hashem. This form of nichush is completely permissible.
According to the Radak, the Gemara refers to this permitted form of nichush. Omens are only meaningful if they are previously chosen for this purpose. If it is not like the nichush of Eliezer, i.e. the person did not intentionally designate this event as a sign beforehand, then it is not nichush, meaning it is worthless and should not be relied upon.
The Radak brings a proof from another story cited in the same Gemara. Rav would decide whether to travel based on the local ferry. Rashi explains that if Rav readily found a ferry available to take him to his destination, he took it as a favorable sign and he would board. On the other hand, if he could only locate a ferry with some difficulty, he took this as a sign to refrain from embarking on the journey.
Now, Rav himself formulated the principle defining nichush based on Eliezer’s sign. How, then, could he himself employ the very same method?
According to Radak’s interpretation, however, the distinction is clear. Rav designated this sign beforehand. Therefore, the negative outcome was indeed significant, and a sufficient and permitted reason to refrain.
The Meshech Chochmah offers a beautiful explanation of why Eliezer’s test was permitted. Nichush means relying on a sign that has no reasonable bearing on the decision. However, Eliezer was only testing whether the girl would display kindness and generosity. This is entirely reasonable and hence not a violation of nichush. It was only when retelling the story to Rivkah’s family that he claimed that the sign was to determine that the girl would be from Avraham’s family, to convince them to go ahead with the match. That is what is identified by the Gemara as the kind of act which qualifies as nichush!
We can now return to our original question. The prohibition of nichush certainly applies to all Yidden, including Yankel. Furthermore, the exceptions mentioned earlier do not seem to apply. There is no logical connection between the fire and his trip. Therefore, it should be forbidden for him to interpret the fire as an omen and stay home.
Rav Zilberstein wonders whether that this case might be comparable to the well-known story with Rabbi Akiva. He was travelling and was refused lodging in a certain town, forcing him to encamp outdoors. Then, a lion devoured his donkey, a cat attacked his rooster, and the wind blew out his candle. Despite these misfortunes, Rebbi Akiva maintained, gam zu l’tova, everything Hashem does is for the best. The next morning, he heard that the town was pillaged by a band of thieves. He then understood how his life was spared, because the thieves could not hear his animals or see his candle lit.
The Ben Yehoyada points out that there was not much he could do when he lost his donkey or his rooster. However, he could have attempted to light his candle again. Instead, he accepted it as an act of fate, declared gam zu l’tova, and did not light it again. Why not?
The Ben Yehoyada explains that Rabbi Akiva could not have left the flame exposed to the elements and yet expected it to remain lit. Surely, he placed it behind some sort of protection. Therefore, when he saw that the candle blew out, despite his efforts, he took this as a Divine sign, and did not light it again.
In our case, too, perhaps the unusual nature of the fire, and the fact that it only damaged that specific drawer, is sufficient reason to interpret it as a message from Hashem and a sign that he should not go on the cruise.
Rav Zilberstein rejects this comparison. Rabbi Akiva lived a life completely connected to Hashem. Therefore, every single event was interpreted as an act of hashgacha pratis and a direct message from Hashem. Furthermore, we can certainly assume that he had ruach hakodesh, and so he understood Hashem’s messages. However, simple folk cannot make such a determination on their own.
However, he cites another Gemara which does proof this point. Rav Yehuda placed a Yid in cherem for acting in a way that resulted in a chilul Hashem. After Rav Yehuda was niftar, this Yid asked the other Rabanim to absolve his cherem. The Chachamim were divided amongst themselves in how to rule. Rav Ami agreed to release him, but Rav Shmuel bar Nachmeine objected. Rav Zeira then made the following observation. Rav Shmuel Bar Nachmeini is almost never present for these discussions. Shall we assume that he just happened to decide to come today? Clearly, it is a sign from Heaven that the cherem should stand.
In other words, the omens prohibited in the Gemara involve everyday occurrences, which are then correlated to specific outcomes. However, the unusual coincidence involving Rav Shmuel Bar Nachmeini can indeed be a sign.
If so, we can indeed draw a comparison to the story with Yankel. Only the drawer caught on fire, and everything in the house stayed intact. This is a sufficiently unusual event. If Yankel is uncomfortable going on the trip, he is permitted to see it as a sign and he can stay home.
