This verse, said to Moshe in the context of a discussion about the Jewish elders, is the source from which the Talmud deduces that we must bring civil disputes only “before them”—the Jewish courts.
Even if the ruling would be identical in either court (Jewish or secular), we are instructed to seek judgment specifically in courts based on Torah law. Why? By seeking out and abiding by the rulings of Torah law, the individual is submitting himself to the will of G-d. In contrast, to abide by the rulings of a secular court, even if their conclusions are identical to those of the Torah, is merely to acknowledge the justness of human conventions and logic.
The importance of observing the laws simply because they are G-d’s will is likewise conveyed in the Talmud’s description of the tactics of the yetzer hara—the voice inside us that draws us to sin. The yetzer hara does not initially suggest that we transgress the most grievous of sins. Rather, “Today he tells him, ‘Do this’; tomorrow he tells him, ‘Do that’; until he bids him, ‘Go and serve idols,’ and he goes and serves.”
Chassidus explains that the yetzer hara’s initial “suggestion” does not involve transgressing even a minor prohibition. He begins by lending credence to mitzvah observance from a rational perspective. He says, “Do this!” meaning, “This mitzvah is justified, even by my standards.”
In this way, the yetzer hara slowly infiltrates a person’s attitude toward Torah observance. Instead of being centered on obedience to G-d’s will, one’s observance of the mitzvos becomes defined by the degree to which he finds a particular mitzvah sensible, useful and personally beneficial. And after successfully diverting a person’s focus from obeying G-d’s will and G-d’s will alone, the yetzer hara can eventually lure him to transgress even the most severe sins.
The Torah therefore instructs us not to adjudicate our disputes in secular courts, even if they will reach the same conclusions as the Torah. For in order not to fall prey to the yetzer hara’s vices, our observance of the Torah’s laws must not be contingent on human rationalization alone. We must approach all the mitzvos with an attitude of kabbolas ol, obeying the mitzvos primarily because they are G-d’s will and we are His subjects.
—Likkutei Sichos, vol. 3, p. 900